CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.537
22 February 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 22 February 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Hendrik Wagenmakers (Netherlands)

GE.90-60238/1593B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 537th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

To begin with, I should like to extend a cordial welcome to the State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, His Excellency Dr. Ferenc Somogyi, who is visiting the Conference today. Dr. Somogyi is a career diplomat with long experience in international organizations and, in particular, the United Nations. He was appointed State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May 1989, and will be addressing the Conference for the first time since he took up his important functions. I am sure that the Conference will follow his statement with particular interest.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda items 1, "Nuclear test ban", and 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". In conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers today His Excellency the State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary and the representatives of the German Democratic Republic and Kenya. Although the speakers' list as circulated shows four speakers, I understand that Ambassador Ledogar of the United States of America will actually be speaking at the next plenary meeting. I now give the floor to his Excellency the State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Dr. Ferenc Somogyi.

Mr. SOMOGYI (Hungary): Mr. President, please allow me at the outset to say how honoured I am to have an opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament - this unique and most significant body in the system of international disarmament machinery - for the first time. I would like to offer you my congratulations and those of the Hungarian delegation on your taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of February, and pledge to you the continuing co-operation of the Hungarian delegation in discharging your responsible duties. Presiding over the last but one plenary meeting, you may rightly claim a good deal of accomplishment in giving a good start to the 1990 session of the CD by successfully solving procedural and political problems as well as re-establishing subsidiary bodies. Like the speakers who have taken the floor before me, I would like, on behalf of the Hungarian delegation, to extend a hearty welcome to those distinguished heads of delegation who have recently joined the Conference and say goodbye to those who have left the CD since the closure of last year's session and wish them all the best in their future assignments.

The past year, and the past couple of months in particular, have produced sweeping and extensive political and social changes all over Europe, and especially in the central and eastern regions of the continent. These revoluntionary changes are aimed at eliminating centralized power structures and creating truly democratic societies in our part of the world. If we accept the notion that a State's internal situation and domestic policy fundamentally determine its activity in foreign relations, we can certainly conclude that these changes will have a favourable impact not only on European and East-West relations, but also on the system of international relations as

(Mr. Somogyi, Hungary)

a whole. In this system profound changes have started during the past five years that have - among other things - opened a new co-operative era in the relationship between the two major Powers as well. That new relationship, based on interdependence and the awareness of common interests, has brought tangible, generally recognized results in the field of international security and disarmament.

The positive dynamism of both Soviet-American and European relations is being felt most strikingly in the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe. The unprecedented speed and intensity of the negotiating process provide clear evidence that genuine political will and commitment do produce progress and bring results. The maintaining of that impetus underscores the widespread and well-founded hopes that the first agreement on the reduction of European conventional forces can be concluded this year. For this hope to come true it is obvious that a number of problems have still to be overcome, which makes it imperative that an appropriate political impulse be given to the negotiating process.

From the very beginning of the Vienna talks on conventional disarmament and on building security and confidence, Hungary has sought to contribute to achieving progress and creating an atmosphere of trust. We put forward proposals at the negotiating table, announced unilateral disarmament measures a year ago, and provided data on a unilateral basis on the structure and deployment of certain elements of the Hungarian armed forces.

Perhaps it is not unknown to those present here that the Hungarian armed forces are undergoing a comprehensive transformation in harmony with our country's defence requirements and economic capabilities. In practice, this means that by the end of 1991 the Hungarian army will be reduced by 35 per cent and its structure changed in order to enhance its defensive character. An integral part of this process is the starting of the bilateral talks that my Government - unanimously supported by Parliament and the general public - has initiated on the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungarian territory this year or in 1991 at the latest. In our view, the reform of our armed forces and the withdrawal of Soviet troops will in no way adversely affect Hungary's defensive capabilities or those of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, but rather will contribute to the creation of security reflecting the new international situation. Hungarian representatives have given detailed information on these questions, supported by data, to participants in the Vienna forums, including the recently concluded seminar on military doctrines.

Our initiative to create a regional zone of security, confidence-building and co-operation with Yugoslavia and Austria is not directly linked to the Vienna negotiations, but it is guided by the same spirit. Under this initiative, the number of tanks stationed in a 50-kilometre-wide Hungarian zone along the borders of the three countries will be reduced by the end of the year by 50 per cent, that is 200 tanks, and further security-building and confidence-building measures going beyond those enshrined in the Stockholm Document will be introduced.

(Mr. Somogyi, Hungary)

In a spirit of military openness, and in addition to military data already provided at the CFE talks and the seminar on military doctrines, I now have pleasure in providing the Conference with comprehensive information on the Hungarian armed forces, which is being distributed along with the text of this statement.

Without going into details now I would just like to mention that the impact of the reform of the Hungarian armed forces is best reflected in the data on military expenditure. I wish to inform the Conference on Disarmament that the Ministry of Defence will have the sum of 44.6 billion forints at its disposal in fiscal year 1990, of which 40.0 billion will be allocated from the State budget and 4.6 billion is the planned income of the Ministry. This represents a 25 per cent decrease in real terms compared to the actual expenditure of the Ministry in 1989. At the same time it is to be noted that approximately 22 per cent of the total sum of 44.6 billion is not meant for direct defence purposes but for financing educational and social institutions belonging to the Ministry. I would like to mention here that the material I have referred to contains information on the financial resources available to the Ministry of Defence in 1990, compiled in conformity with the standardized reporting system on military budgets adopted by the United Nations.

The "open skies" régime, on which substantive negotiations have recently started in Ottawa, can also strengthen confidence and at the same time play a role in the verification of a future CFE agreement. We have supported the initiative from the very outset, and it was in that spirit that last January a pioneering experiment was carried out in Hungary in connection with this régime. As is well known, an unarmed aircraft from a NATO country, Canada, conducted a trial flight in Hungarian airspace on a flight path determined by Canadian specialists. The objective of the experiment was to gather technical flight experience relating to the verification system to be established under the "open skies" régime. Diplomatic and military experts from countries belonging to the two alliances were perfectly able to work together and gained positive experience. I believe that can be confirmed by our Canadian partners. At the end of January, in order to assess the results of the trial flight, we held an informal consultation in Budapest with the participation of experts from the 23 States that are to join the future régime. In accordance with the agreement which was reached at the conference in Ottawa, Budapest is to host the second and concluding phase of the "open skies" negotiations, during which the treaty on the régime is to be signed.

The process of international disarmament has always been determined by the positions and disarmament activities of the two major Powers. It is therefore a welcome fact that a positive picture is emerging not only at the European disarmament talks, but also at the various Soviet-American disarmament negotiations. There is a general expectation that an agreement on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive weapons will soon be ready for signature. One can hardly overestimate the significance of that agreement, which will certainly stimulate other disarmament efforts as well. Similarly, progress at the bilateral talks on the banning of chemical weapons appears to be encouraging.

(Mr. Somogyi, Hungary)

We can also welcome the fact that, as a result of three years of Soviet-American negotiations, the fate of the two bilateral treaties signed a decade and a half ago, but never ratified, can finally be settled. The verification protocols to be attached to the 1974 and 1976 treaties on the limitation of nuclear explosions for military and peaceful purposes appear to be ready for signing at the upcoming Soviet-American summit, and that would lead to the long-awaited ratification of the two treaties.

In contrast to the optimistic picture of the European disarmament process and the Soviet-American bilateral disarmament negotiations, the situation in multilateral disarmament looks distressing. There is an increasingly striking contradiction in our view, between the progress achieved in European regional disarmament and in the bilateral talks, on the one hand, and the lack of results in multilateral disarmament negotiations on the other. It is alarming that certain States, losing sight of the global aspects of the outstanding disarmament issues, do not wish to make use of the possibilities provided by multilateralism, thus precluding its machinery from contributing to the elaboration and implementation of comprehensive multilateral disarmament measures. From the other direction the lack of progress is exacerbated by stances that ignore present realities and demand immediate and comprehensive disarmament measures on the basis of an "all or nothing" approach, thus denying and consequently abandoning the possibility of achieving our common objectives in stages, through partial results.

Representatives of the Hungarian Government take every opportunity to express the firm view that in the long run, one cannot afford the lack of results in multilateral disarmament without casting doubt on the very existence of this institution. That can only be avoided by displaying political will and a constructive attitude. Hungary has always been ready to contribute to the viability of multilateral disarmament yielding practical and tangible results, since, as a small country, it cannot have any other interest than that of giving constant support to efforts aimed at demonstrating the usefulness of multilateral co-operation.

Undoubtedly the viability of multilateral disarmament can best be proved by the speedy elaboration and conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. This appears to be the only issue on which the Conference on Disarmament is conducting substantive negotiations with the well-founded hope that, despite existing political, military, industrial, legal and other problems, the agreement can be concluded soon.

It is an arduous task to summarize the efforts of the past two years as regards the banning of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles. Work in this area has become increasingly intensive over the years. Last year the Ad hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament dealing with the question of chemical weapons accomplished an unprecedented amount of work, which was also reflected in the inter-sessional meetings of the Committee. Thus, the general desire expressed at the Paris Conference for a redoubling of efforts aimed at concluding the chemical weapons convention has, in the literary sense of the word, been fulfilled. At the same time we cannot ignore the fact that, despite the enormous amount of work accomplished, no agreement has been reached on the key elements of the draft convention.

(Mr. Somogyi, Hungary)

This is all the more deplorable since last year we witnessed a number of promising events, such as the Paris Conference already mentioned or the commitment of the Canberra Conference to the cause of prohibiting chemical weapons.

The forty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly can also be cited here. At this session, American and Soviet statements heralded the sincere readiness of the two parties to radically reduce their chemical weapon stockpiles even before the conclusion of the convention. The meeting of the leaders of the two major Powers in Malta produced a further indication that an agreement on 80 per cent reductions in the two States' chemical weapon stockpiles could be concluded at the Soviet-American summit scheduled for early summer, and this was reaffirmed in the joint statement adopted at the recent Moscow meeting of their Foreign Ministers.

It is possible for the impact of these events to determine this year's activity in the Conference on Disarmament and enhance the prevailing optimism concerning the early conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. That requires the solution of such problems as the scope of the convention in its final form, or the unconditional prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, for example. Solving these questions could help finalize the technical, organizational and procedural aspects of the draft convention on the basis of the significant progress made so far.

A reliable verification system is a determining factor in the effective implementation of a future chemical weapons convention. The system, the main elements of which are already in place, will include the important mechanism of a non-refusable "challenge inspection". We believe that the useful idea of "ad hoc checks" could well be inserted into the existing structure of verification. This method of inspection based on an elaborate system of quotas could be an efficient part of the complex verification system and would provide the participating States with a further opportunity to display their openness and willingness to co-operate.

In this connection, we welcome and fully support the proposal officially put forward by the Foreign Minister of Austria at the opening session of the Conference on Disarmament that Austria should host the international organization to be set up under the terms of the future convention. Austria, which is not a full member of the Conference on Disarmament, has always displayed keen interest in a chemical weapons ban, and this new contribution provides further evidence of its commitment to the cause of the convention.

The Hungarian Government has repeatedly and concretely demonstrated its determination to promote actively, in every constructive way, the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, the destruction of their stockpiles, and the early conclusion of a convention thereon. This was manifested in the unilateral initiative put forward by our Foreign Minister at the recent session of the United Nations General Assembly, declaring Hungary's readiness to act in conformity with the future convention. That means that - besides reaffirming our chemical-weapon-free status - Hungary is ready to comply with all the provisions of the future convention even before it is concluded and enters into force. It also means that we intend to make a

(Mr. Somogyi, Hungary)

declaration on production, exports and imports of chemicals related to the convention. Furthermore, we are ready - on a reciprocal basis - to submit to verification the contents of that declaration, as well as our defence, industrial and trading activities relating to the convention. In accordance with that initiative, we hereby submit to the Conference document CD/969, containing a comprehensive declaration on production of and foreign trade in chemicals, as provided for in the relevant provisions of the convention.

I also wish to inform the Conference on Disarmament that as a part of the Hungarian initiative, a national body will be set up in the near future to continue the work which has been carried out informally in the last four years by an inter-departmental commission, and perform provisionally some of the duties of the national authority to be established in accordance with the convention. By operating this body, we intend to gather preliminary experience relating to the functioning of such a national authority.

The comprehensive nuclear test ban is formally high on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Yet in the past couple of years all efforts aimed at setting up a subsidiary body on this item have proved futile. Those present here might agree that in past decades all the possible arguments in favour of a comprehensive test ban have been put forward in this hall, yet we still lack a multilateral legal instrument that would outlaw all nuclear explosions once and for all. This issue of wider importance in arms control and non-proliferation has, unfortunately, not yet secured the consent of certain nuclear-weapon States. We do hope that the signing of the already mentioned verification protocols to the threshold test-ban treaties will be followed by Soviet-American talks on further limiting the number and yield of nuclear test explosions. In spite of the difficulties encountered, the endeavours aimed at achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban must not be abandoned. The key role of the CD in this field is evident and indispensable. Embarking on substantive work cannot be delayed in those areas where the realities make it possible, and the issue of verification is such an area.

It is to be hoped that an attitude based on realism and a spirit of compromise will prevail at the conference to be convened to consider amendments to the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty. In our view, the amendment conference could become a milestone in solving the problem of nuclear testing by contributing to the creation of an international consensus in favour of a comprehensive test ban. It is evident that the final solution can be envisaged only on a global scale with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. We believe that every opportunity should be taken to promote politically the cause of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. But such activity must not lead to irrational confrontation which would hardly serve the achievement of our common objective.

The Hungarian Government has supported the prohibition of radiological weapons from the very outset. The draft treaty on the subject was tabled more than 10 years ago, but we are still far from signing an international agreement, despite the progress made in identifying problems. In our view, one of the most positive developments in the work of the Conference on Disarmament in this field was the recognition that the issue of the

(Mr. Somogyi, Hungary)

prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities should be addressed and settled. Dealing with the two issues together has failed to produce a satisfactory result. Without calling into question the importance of the prohibition of radiological weapons, it appears to be sensible to settle the issue of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, irrespective of the outcome of the negotiations on radiological weapons in the traditional sense. In our view, this tendency has been present in the practical activities of the ad hoc Committee of the CD on this topic in recent years. Unfortunately, the work carried out in this period could be summarized in its reports merely by recording the fact that differences in positions have presented themselves in a more and more visible form.

This lack of progress is certainly disappointing, since our interest in the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities stands on several pillars. While the States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty which have renounced the possession and acquisition of nuclear weapons have not yet received any international legal guarantee aimed at ensuring the security of peaceful nuclear facilities and of their activities, as provided for in article IV of the Treaty, it is alarming that attacks on nuclear facilities play an important role in planning war-fighting scenarios. It is a matter of concern that an attack launched against nuclear facilities, even by conventional weapons, would result in the discharge of radioactive material that would cause long-lasting damage to the country and society attacked. This risk is even more accentuated in the case of countries of a size and population density similar to Hungary's. We also maintain that the existing legal provisions stipulated in the 1977 Additional Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions are insufficient.

In view of the above, the demand that a legal instrument prohibiting attacks on nuclear facilities and ensuring undisturbed peaceful nuclear activities should be drawn up cannot be considered unjustifiable. The most appropriate forum for the speedy elaboration of such an international treaty has yet to be found.

Finally, looking ahead somewhat, I would like to say a few words about a diplomatic event that is to take place this year, the outcome of which will largely determine the way we can think of the present and future of multilateral disarmament. The fourth review conference on the non-proliferation Treaty will provide an opportunity for States parties to the Treaty to reaffirm once again the outstanding political significance of that legal instrument in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, reducing the danger of nuclear war, strengthening international security and promoting the unlimited use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Despite the fact that the implementation of its individual articles has been uneven, the non-proliferation Treaty has proved to be an efficient tool in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The system of conferences to review implementation has helped to activate disarmament talks on the cessation of the arms race also. The fullest implementation of the provisions of the Treaty is in the interest of the international community, and of course in Hungary's interest too.

(Mr. Somogyi, Hungary)

The most contentious section of the treaty is undoubtedly article VI. It is undeniable, of course, that the objectives set forth therein could not be fully met during the years that have passed since the last review conference. Only initial, but politically significant steps have been taken by the two major Powers to curb the nuclear arms race and promote nuclear disarmament. On this basis, further serious efforts are needed not only on the part of the two major Powers and the other nuclear-weapon States, but also by the Conference on Disarmament, which demands a role of its own in the process.

At the same time, insistence on further results and failure to obtain them must not lead to the weakening of an international legal instrument that has fulfilled its main objectives and has a universal character. We cannot afford to eliminate a working institution from the politically fragile and incomplete infrastructure of multilateral disarmament. That cannot - we are convinced - be in the interest of either those who call others to account, or those who are called to account themselves. It would run particularly counter to the interest of mankind as a whole. Hungary, having suffered the consequences of two world conflagrations, has had the chance - together with a number of other nations - to learn the lesson: it is always much easier to destroy than to build or reconstruct.

In spite of the problems described above, we sincerely hope that through joint efforts we will be able to revitalize multilateral disarmament in order to integrate it into the multilateral institutions of the evolving new system of international relations. In this manner, multilateral disarmament can live up to the decade-long positive disarmament traditions and contribute to the attainment of further tangible results. Let me, in conclusion, assure you that the Republic of Hungary as well as our delegation to the Conference on Disarmament will continue to be ready to play an active and constructive role in order to reach this lofty goal.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary for his important statement and for the kind words that he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): let me say first a word in tribute to your balanced and encouraging statement at the opening of the 1990 spring session of the Conference on Disarmament. I should like to congratulate you warmly on taking up your high and also responsible office, and wish you successful work. I am confident that under your able and efficient stewardship the Conference will be heading for a good start which will lead us to concrete results in the negotiating process. I wish you and the Secretary-General of our Conference much success in your business. You may rest assured of my delegation's full support.

The outgoing President, Ambassador Benhima, deserves our appreciation and gratitude for his profound commitment during the past period of work.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

To all our colleagues who have taken up new assignments since the closure of the 1989 session, I wish success in the discharge of their new responsibilities. Finally, I should like to warmly welcome the new colleagues in our midst and pledge them my delegation's readiness for good and fruitful co-operation. Let me also thank State Secretary Ferenc Somogyi from Hungary for his interesting and thought-provoking statement made just now.

This session of the Geneva Conference is taking place against the background of remarkable changes. Radical changes and dynamic developments are going on. Barriers are withering away. New links are being forged. What is at stake is peace through disarmament and the shift from confrontation to inter-system co-operation. New security structures are needed.

It is with justified hope that all forces that really desire arms limitation and disarmament, security and co-operation are setting their sights on Geneva. The German Democratic Republic also maintains that 1990 must become the year of disarmament. Let us not allow the disarmament process to lag behind political developments. Let us keep up the challenge in disarmament policy. Let us keep to the agreement that multilateral disarmament negotiations can only be conducted in the context of the international climate. And this climate has undoubtedly improved. This is corroborated by the fact that concrete results are within reach in the Soviet-American negotiations on the halving of their strategic offensive weapons. The headway made in the Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces and armaments is encouraging. Their dynamic continuation nurtures the hope that the first round will be concluded soon, yielding positive results.

Prolonged negotiations on the verification protocols to the Soviet-American agreements of 1974 and 1976 are drawing to a close. We welcome this, and look forward to their ratification in the near future.

With the agreements reached in Ottawa on the "open skies" régime, a new element has been added to the disarmament process. The day before yesterday, the Soviet Union and the United States resumed their bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons. We expect this round to produce decisive impetus for the earliest conclusion of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Finally, the results of the forty-fourth United Nations General Assembly session are on the Conference table.

Of course, one cannot speak of spectacular breakthroughs. But it would be just as wrong to underestimate what has been achieved at this General Assembly session. In our opinion, steps have definitely been taken in the right direction. The resolutions on a chemical weapons ban, in the nuclear field, on the use of science and technology for disarmament and on the issue of defensive security concepts offer a good many starting-points for the work of our Conference. The Vienna seminar on military doctrines reveals what relevance attaches to the last-named resolution of the forty-fourth United Nations General Assembly Session. We share the view already expressed in the course of our debate that the Geneva Conference should join in this international discussion, too.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

As a member of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament for 15 years now, the German Democratic Republic has made a distinctive contribution to making peace more secure and advancing arms limitation and disarmament. It will continue to act along these lines. In autumn last year, a sweeping process of renewal was embarked upon in our country. All-embracing democratization is unfolding. This democratization is an act of self-determination; it cannot be brought in from outside. Let us do everything that strengthens sober-minded, balanced and worthy action and counteracts instability in the field of security and disarmament. Thus, the process of democratization opens up new opportunities in establishing a system of democratic and demilitarized international relations.

The German Democratic Republic is implementing the unilateral disarmament measures announced in 1989, which can be publicly supervised. By the end of 1990, the army of the German Democratic Republic will be reduced by 10,000 troops, 600 tanks and 50 combat aircraft. And that is not all. As from 26 January this year, in addition, another 35,000 to 40,000 army members will retire from the army in connection with the transition to 12-month military service. Two days ago a law was passed on service without arms - that means an alternative national service. The defence budget will shrink by at least 10 per cent. What is more, a new national military doctrine for the German Democratic Republic is under discussion. The state of drafting reflects the consensus reached with all social forces in our country. The parliament of the German Democratic Republic will shortly deal with this important document.

This I think bears witness to the fact that we are persistently and resolutely working towards a weapon-free world. We hope that these disarmament initiatives will have a mobilizing effect, and that the process of disarmament now under way will receive strong impulses from all sides.

All this goes to show that the year 1990 has made a promising start. Now let us contribute our share to ensure that it does, in fact, become the year of disarmament. What could serve this aim better than completing the convention banning chemical weapons? The German Democratic Republic has, without ifs and buts, pronounced itself in favour of the global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons. It figures among those States which have declared that they do not possess chemical weapons, and applies strict export controls to dual-purpose chemicals.

We stand committed to the agreements reached in Paris and to the outcome of the Canberra Conference. We are in favour of making 1990 the crucial year in concluding a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, as well as on their destruction. What encourages us in this endeavour is the joint Soviet-American statement on chemical weapons recently agreed in Moscow, as well as the readiness of the USSR and the United States to start reducing chemical weapons before the entry into force of the convention outlawing them. Furthermore, we are encouraged by the Soviet Declaration on cessation of the production of chemical weapons, and hope that this will not remain a unilateral move. We feel encouraged by the mandate of the CW Committee agreed upon some days ago here in this forum.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

And, last but not least, we are encouraged by the report on the current state of negotiations presented on Tuesday. The outgoing Chairman of the CW Committee, Ambassador Morel, deserves our appreciation and gratitude for his committed and creative guidance of the negotiations.

The time seems ripe to get down to the final drafting of the convention - i.e. to focus work on the still outstanding essentials and on completing the articles. They encompass, in our view, verification measures, the order of destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities, agreements on assistance in the event of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons as well as in economic and technological development, the definition of chemical weapons and the composition of the future executive council of the organization. A good many expandable starting-points were provided in the informal consultations on such key issues last year.

Now we think it is imperative to take decisions. It will certainly be no easy job, but it will be possible. As experience in other disarmament forums shows, a meeting of the Geneva Disarmament Conference at foreign minister level would be appropriate to give a powerful boost in this regard. An informal discussion on this matter would be worth while.

The provisions to be agreed on the verification of a chemical weapons ban are of special interest. In our opinion, such a verification system should, first, reliably guarantee that no chemical weapons are produced and that they will never be developed again. Secondly, it must be cost-effective and ensure reliable verification with the most efficient means. Thirdly, it must be feasible. And fourthly it should not lay unnecessary burdens on the chemical industry. Legitimate scientific, technological and commercial interests need to be taken into account.

Challenge inspections in cases of violation of the agreements have occupied a central spot in the disarmament accords at least since the conclusion of the INF Treaty. They constitute an important element of confidence-building and effective verification. This also goes for the prohibition of chemical weapons, for which the German Democratic Republic is ready to agree to radical verification provisions. We think that efforts are already needed, at the national level too, to determine which legislative and administrative measures can ensure that the comprehensive obligations under the convention are fulfilled correctly and on schedule. In the end, all efforts towards a chemical weapons ban hinge on a world-wide consensus that precludes any use of chemical weapons, stops their production and proliferation and reliably guarantees their complete destruction within a period of 10 years. If this was actually achieved, it would fulfil, at long last, a demand which the peoples raised 75 years ago under the spell of the lethal gas cloud of Ypres.

Regarding nuclear disarmament, there are several urgent issues that remain pending. The year 1990 offers a chance to generate momentum in these subjects. All are awaiting a treaty on 50 per cent reductions in Soviet and American strategic offensive weapons. And all are expecting agreements between the USSR and the United States on substantial cuts in the number and yield of their nuclear test explosions. A conference on the extension of

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty to underground testing is in the offing. In September the fourth review conference on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is to be held. My country supports these initiatives.

We also consider that the Geneva Conference on Disarmament should pull its weight and concentrate henceforth on the substantive issues pertaining to a nuclear test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Is it not opportune now to establish a committee of this conference dealing with all aspects related to a test ban - especially since almost all members have come out in favour of it? I should like to assure Ambassador Donowaki of Japan of our delegation's unqualified support in his endeavours towards this end.

The German Democratic Republic advocates an immediate ban on nuclear weapon tests. It was in this spirit that our delegation submitted a working paper on the verification of a nuclear test ban. The Group of Scientific Experts has carried out important spadework for a verification system to monitor compliance with a comprehensive nuclear test ban. We believe it is time to clarify the aspects of such a system that go beyond seismological questions in an appropriate forum - be it a new expert group or a GSE enlarged by an amended mandate.

At this juncture, I call to mind the proposal to hold at least a structured debate on the questions associated with the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, I recall the proposal made by the German Democratic Republic that we should begin with the elaboration of principles governing nuclear disarmament. In our view the Soviet proposal on cessation of the production of fissionable material merits being considered in depth by the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. I think this shows that there is really no lack of substance in the discussions on nuclear issues in our Conference.

In the field of the prevention of an arms race in outer space too we are carrying many problems into the 1990s. Rapid and serious steps are urgently needed now to diminish these deficiencies. Thanks to the committed work of Ambassador Bayart, Chairman of the outer space Committee, a considerable number of proposals lie on the table. The German Democratic Republic is prepared to hold discussions in an intensive manner, with experts being involved. Far-reaching understanding seems to exist in terms of the usefulness of confidence-building measures. Here we have in mind the proposals made by France, Canada, the USSR, the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland. The same holds true for the proposals advanced by socialist States and non-aligned countries concerning agreements on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and other space weapons. The German Democratic Republic has repeatedly taken initiatives in this field, and intends to develop them further.

Winding up my statement, I would like to say a word concerning the future work of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. I believe that Ambassador de Azambuja and Ambassador de Rivero rightly turned to this issue some days ago. As we all know, the question is to fully explore the possibilities and potentials of this unique multilateral disarmament body to

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

render it more effective and to strengthen its authority. We deem it imperative to adjust the Conference to the requirements of the 1990s. Rapid developments are going on everywhere. New priorities are taking shape. In our view, this calls for analysing what has been achieved to date, surmounting impediments, continuing what has proved positive and responding to anything new. The current agenda mirrors the consensus reached years ago. But since then we have acquired a good deal of experience. Would it not also be worthwhile today, for example, addressing such questions as maritime confidence-building measures or nuclear risk reduction? At all events we should try to identify joint points of departure, in whatever form and forum, which ought to be put on the agenda today and which are negotiable.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement, and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Kenya, Ambassador Ogada.

Mr. OGADA (Kenya): Mr. President, accept my warm congratulations on taking up the office of President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of February 1990. The Kenyan delegation recognizes that your experience in international diplomacy will immensely benefit the work of this Conference. In the course of this month you have been able to solve some difficult issues pertaining to the work of this Conference and for this, credit must be accorded to you. Your country, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, a country with which Kenya enjoys cordial relations, has demonstrated in words and deeds her commitment to disarmament and arms control objectives. I also thank the distinguished Ambassador El Ghali Benhima of the Kingdom of Morocco for having successfully presided over the Conference during the month of August 1989 and the inter-sessional period. Today the Conference is graced with the presence of the State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary, whose statement we have listened to with keen attention.

As I am speaking in this Conference for the first time, I welcome the Ambassadors who have recently assumed their duties in the Conference, namely Ambassador Roberto García Moritán of Argentina, Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada, Ambassador Hou Zhitong of China, Ambassador José Pérez Novoa of Cuba, Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki of Japan, Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar of the United States of America and Ambassador Horacio Arteaga of Venezuela. I would like to assure them of the co-operation of my delegation in the work of this Conference.

The Kenya delegation has taken note of the departure of Ambassador Marchand, Ambassador Taylhardat, Ambassador Friedersdorf and Ambassador García Robles. The achievements and interest of Ambassador García Robles in the field of disarmament have been widely acclaimed, and the Kenya delegation would like to pay homage to his unyielding commitment to disarmament objectives. We wish all the ambassadors who have left the Conference success in their future activities.

Before commenting on issues which directly touch on the work of this Conference I would like to hail the release of Nelson Mandela as a significant step in the fight to abolish apartheid in South Africa. Tribute must be paid

(Mr. Ogada, Kenya)

to this man of great stature who has suffered for so long to liberate all South Africans (Black, Brown and White). We salute his courage and determination to eradicate apartheid.

The Conference on Disarmament commenced its annual session for 1990 amidst very dramatic transformations in international affairs. The past year witnessed a radical change in various parts of the world. The political events that have manifested themselves, if they take hold, promise to contribute immensely to an improved climate in international peace and security. These transformations that have become the reality of the day are leading to a new international order which it is expected will be founded on trust and co-operation rather than on mistrust and confrontation. To be candid, the management of international affairs through the latter approach has only made the condition of the world worse. In the past, before these new changes occurred, immense resources had to be diverted to sustain policies of confrontation rather than being invested in policies which promoted peace and stability. The emerging new order on the international scene promises to promote relations between States, especially the two super-Powers, to the long-desired level of positive co-operation and mutual trust in their affairs.

Ever since the end of the Second World War, the world has been burdened with the accumulation of many weapons, including weapons of mass destruction. Of course, we realize that the international politics at the time necessitated continued accumulation of such weapons, especially by the two super-Powers and their allies in the opposing military alliances that they each belong to. The spectre of a third world war, as a result of the military build-up of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, was a constant fear not only in Europe, where the highest concentration of nuclear and conventional weapons is found, but also all over the world.

At the moment, with the political changes that have occurred, the threat of a global nuclear conflict is receding. Today, issues that were a taboo in the past are being discussed openly and solutions to them are being earnestly considered. The ideological divisions and other barriers that separated countries in Europe are coming down, and it can only be hoped that a stable and permanent peace will prevail in this region based on a mechanism acceptable to all concerned with the peace and security of Europe.

Peace and security are desired objectives in all regions of the world, and it would be regrettable if, at a time when Europe is witnessing moves towards conventional and nuclear disarmament, the stockpiling of arms in other parts of the world were to occur as a result of the acquisition of a variety of offensive military weapons. Many of these regions are faced with difficult political, socio-economic, environmental and other problems, and should be allowed all the necessary means to solve these problems without resort to military confrontation and unnecessary external arms supplies. In other words, the transfer of problems associated with various types of weapons from one region to another would be a blow to the attainment of international peace and security.

(Mr. Ogada, Kenya)

With the evident changes that have occurred, some of which have a direct bearing on the work and character of this Conference, it may be necessary for the Conference on Disarmament to redefine itself in response to these changes. The Conference continues to faithfully observe rules and practices which, in the light of these changes, could be interpreted as being out of step with the current reality. If the Conference is to avoid the criticism that it is alienated from the reality of the current world situation it should allow itself to reflect, in an appropriate manner, the political changes that have taken place as well as the practical successes that have been achieved in bilateral and regional negotiations on issues which touch on some of the specific items on the Conference's agenda.

Undoubtedly, the Conference has invested its energies in efforts to work out a convention banning chemical weapons with some tangible results. In the past year the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Pierre Morel of France was able to make progress on a number of outstanding issues relating to inspection guidelines, legal and technical issues and the other organs to be associated with the convention, as well as some highly political issues like challenge inspection.

The proposed convention is clearly taking shape, and it cannot be denied that the Paris international conference prohibiting chemical weapons and the Canberra Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons have had a positive impact on the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. My delegation would like to join those delegations that have already thanked Ambassador Morel and those who worked closely with him for their indefatigable efforts in advancing the work of the Ad hoc Committee. The quality of the present draft text of the convention banning chemical weapons indicates that the day is not far off when the convention will be ready for conclusion.

Ambassador Carl-Magnus Hyltenius of Sweden has taken up the chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We are convinced that he will be able to conduct the work of this subsidiary body to the satisfaction of all delegations, and that this may be the year the Ad hoc Committee reaches the finishing-line in its work to conclude the long-awaited convention prohibiting chemical weapons. Of course, this would require the extensive consideration of all outstanding issues, including those pointed out in the statement of the Group of 21 that was made in the plenary of this Conference on 6 February this year. We would like to wish Ambassador Hyltenius success in the tasks lying ahead of him.

It is understandable that the Conference on Disarmament has devoted so much of its time to the activities of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The promise of a convention banning these hideous weapons spurs the Conference to focus its attention almost exclusively on this issue. It is to be hoped that this promise will hold to avoid disappointment and frustration within the Conference.

(Mr. Ogada, Kenya)

The joint United States-USSR statement declaring that the two super-Powers are ready to undertake practical bilateral action with respect to the elimination of chemical weapons is certainly welcome news, and will no doubt benefit the work of the Ad hoc Committee. However, it should be remembered that the Conference has identified nuclear disarmament as a priority objective. Yet on issues related to nuclear disarmament the Conference has made little headway. At a time when the two super-Powers have signed and implemented an agreement eliminating a category of nuclear weapons, and when favourable prospects exist for their signing a treaty eliminating 50 per cent of their strategic nuclear forces, the efforts of this Conference to deal with nuclear disarmament issues have stagnated.

No other single action could demonstrate the commitment of States to nuclear disarmament better than the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. We are aware of the great efforts that have been made towards establishing an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban, and the commendable role played by the delegation of Japan in this regard. We commend Ambassador Donowaki for agreeing to continue the efforts already initiated by his predecessor on this important issue. This is a good sign which indicates the undiminished interest of delegations on this specific issue.

We do remember that on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty, a treaty which prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, some members of this Conference rightly proposed an amendment conference to expand the Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty by prohibiting underground nuclear tests. This amendment conference, we have been informed, will take place early next year. The fact that more than a third of the States parties to this partial test-ban Treaty supported the request for an amendment conference is a clear political indication that many countries are willing to exploit any avenue that could possibly lead to the realization of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. My delegation does not see the aims of the amendment conference on the nuclear test ban issue as conflicting with those of the Conference on Disarmament, but as moving parallel to each other.

An event that will take place later this year and is also related to the nuclear test ban issue is the proposed fourth conference to review the non-proliferation Treaty. In this Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States parties to it assumed certain obligations which were expected to be fulfilled in good faith. The obligations assumed by the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT have been evidently fulfilled. One of the obligations assumed by the nuclear-weapon States was the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and the continuation of negotiations to this end. This and other obligations undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States have yet to be fulfilled. Naturally, it is expected that a host of questions on the unfulfilled obligations contained in the non-proliferation Treaty will be presented during the fourth review conference. It is hoped that answers to these questions will be convincing, as they will have a bearing on the 1995 conference to determine the future of this treaty, which has to a large extent served the international community adequately in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Ogada, Kenya)

Nuclear disarmament is another very important obligation that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT undertook on acceding to it. Some steps at the bilateral level have been taken towards nuclear disarmament, but the process is far from over. Nuclear weapons continue to be in the arsenals of States both within this treaty and outside it. Perhaps with the process of change already taking place in the world, and bearing in mind the achievements of the United States-USSR bilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons, it would be important to review the role of nuclear weapons in the present world military and political situation.

I would like to underline that, in relation to the NPT and this forum also, non-nuclear-weapon States will continue their reasonable demand for the nuclear-weapon States to provide them with assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, in an internationally legally binding instrument, pending the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.

The Conference on Disarmament should exploit the opportunity presented by the international situation so as to realize progress in its work. At no other time in the history of this Conference has the international climate been so favourable to positive deliberations in the Conference as this year. Therefore let us be part of these historic changes and not remain impassively outside them.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Kenya for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? It seems not.

I should like to inform you that we have received additional requests from non-members for participation in the work of the Conference. Three requests have been circulated this week and, if there are no objections, we shall take them all up together at our next plenary meeting on Tuesday 27 February.

I have no other business for this plenary meeting, and I now intend to adjourn it. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday 27 February, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.538
27 February 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 27 February 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Hendrik Wagenmakers (Netherlands)

GE.90-60263/1631B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 538th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I should like to extend a warm welcome to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of China, His Excellency Mr. Qian Qichen, who will be addressing the Conference today as first speaker. I should like to underline the fact that the visit of His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is an experienced diplomat, is taking place on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of his country's participation in the work of this multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, China having joined immediately before taking up the chairmanship of the then Committee on Disarmament. The involvement of China in this multilateral disarmament negotiating forum was a significant event, as for the first time all nuclear-weapon States were represented in this body. Since then, China has participated actively in our work, also by appointing some time later a special representative for disarmament matters. I look forward to the statement of His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs today, and I should like to thank him for having decided to visit us to convey the views of his Government in the field of disarmament.

I would also like to extend a special welcome to the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Mr. Jan Martenson.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda items 1, "Nuclear test ban", and 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As announced at our last plenary meeting, I shall put before the Conference for decision today additional requests from non-members for participation in the work of the Conference. Once the list of speakers is exhausted, I shall convene an informal meeting of the Conference for that purpose.

I have on my list of speakers today His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of China and the representatives of Yugoslavia, the United States of America and Indonesia. I now give the floor to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of China, Mr. Qian Qichen.

Mr. QIAN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, in the first spring of the 1990s and on the tenth anniversary of China's participation in the work of the Conference on Disarmament, it is a great privilege for me to come to the Palais des Nations and join all my colleagues here who are dedicated to international peace and disarmament in discussing some of the major concerns facing the people of the world. Please allow me to offer my congratulations to you on taking up the presidency of the Conference for this month. I believe that your rich experience and diplomatic skills will help bring about new progress in our work. I would also like to extend my regards to Mr. Jan Martenson, Director-General of the United Nations Office in Geneva, Mr. M. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, and all the delegations present here.

(Mr. Qian, China)

The 1980s that have just gone by witnessed tremendous changes in the world. While some progress has been made in such areas as relaxation of tension in the military sphere and the disarmament process, rivalry between different forces in the world, big-Power interference in the internal affairs of some countries and the perennial tension and turbulence in some regions with extremely acute complexities cannot but cause concern. Along with the evolution in the international situation, world disarmament has moved ahead somewhat in recent years from its long-standing stagnation, and some preliminary concrete results have been achieved in the disarmament effort. Supported and urged on by hundreds of millions of people, many Governments and organizations have taken an active part in extensive discussion and settlement of disarmament issues, working together to promote progress in disarmament. In their urgent need for peace, security and development, the third world and small and medium-sized countries at large strongly call for a halt to the big-Power arms race. They have put forward many reasonable proposals, including those for the establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones in many parts of the world. With their practical action, these countries have made an important contribution to the maintenance of peace and stability and to the endeavour towards disarmament.

The United Nations has done a great deal of work in the field of multilateral disarmament. Many positive resolutions and documents on disarmament have been adopted at successive United Nations General Assembly sessions, SSODs, the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development and the international conferences on chemical weapons. The World Disarmament Campaign sponsored by the United Nations, and many special studies on arms reduction issues, have helped promote the disarmament efforts of all Governments and peoples. The Conference on Disarmament is playing a uniquely important role as the sole global multilateral negotiating body on disarmament and has, in particular, registered noted progress in the negotiations regarding a convention on the prohibition of CW.

One may recall that back in the early 1980s the United States and the Soviet Union continuously escalated the arms race between them and engaged in intense rivalry in many parts of the world. This was criticized and opposed by peoples of all countries, as the tension and confrontation between them constituted a grave threat to world security and stability. At the same time, their incessant arms expansion imposed a heavy burden on them and added to their fiscal and economic difficulties. Against this background, the two super-Powers have made some headway in arms control negotiations over the past few years. After a number of summit meetings and lengthy negotiations, they finally concluded a treaty on the total destruction of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. Their bilateral negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms and on chemical weapons are gradually moving ahead. The CFE negotiations are also making headway. This is well received by peoples of all countries. It should be noted, however, that the above-mentioned progress is preliminary and limited, that there is still a long way to go as far as disarmament is concerned, and that there are numerous obstacles and difficulties on the way ahead. Even if the United States and the Soviet Union were to cut their strategic nuclear arsenals by half, they would still possess over 90 per cent of all the nuclear weapons in the world, more than enough to destroy the whole of mankind several times over, thus remaining the biggest threat to international security.

(Mr. Qian, China)

Judging from the United States-Soviet negotiations, the strategic warheads each side will retain after the cuts are expected to exceed by far the proclaimed ceiling of 6,000. The actual cut envisaged is therefore far less than 50 per cent. As some key categories of weapons are decoupled or shelved, these negotiations fall short of covering all types of strategic nuclear weapons in the hands of the two sides. With the arms talks focusing mainly on the question of quantity but evading that of quality, the arms race between the two countries has not come to a genuine halt but has turned more to the qualitative aspect. For example, a new generation of ICBMs, SLBMs, strategic bombers and cruise missiles with greater accuracy, penetration and mobility has joined the already enormous strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The United States and the Soviet Union are applying the most sophisticated scientific and technological achievements to the development of space weaponry. This will inevitably extend the current arms race on land, at sea and in the air to a new arena - outer space - thereby adding a new threat to the world peace. It should be stressed, in particular, that many of the justified wishes and demands of the third world and small and medium-sized countries on the question of disarmament have not been given due attention. In the eyes of some big Powers, multilateral disarmament efforts seem to be negligible. More often than not, their significance and role are deliberately underestimated. Consequently, in the multilateral field, including this Conference, progress on a number of important disarmament questions is not satisfactory and in some cases has simply stalled. In recent years there have been obvious attempts to shift the pressure onto the third world by exploiting such issues as conventional disarmament and the prevention of nuclear and CW proliferation.

A brief review of the realities in the field of disarmament gives us enough reason to conclude that the world today is neither trouble-free nor tranquil, and that it is no time to sit back and relax. It remains a heavy responsibility for us all to safeguard peace and strive for disarmament. With a view to ensuring a correct orientation for the disarmament process, it is necessary to reaffirm and emphasize the following. The two super-Powers, which possess the largest arsenals, bear a special responsibility for disarmament. They should not only slash the number of their armaments, but also completely stop their qualitative arms race. They should withdraw all their armed forces stationed abroad and remove all their military bases from foreign soil. All United States-Soviet disarmament agreements must contribute to the maintenance of international peace and stability without prejudice to the interests of any third country. The troops designated for reduction should be disbanded and not transferred to any other place. All the weapons and equipment thus cut should be destroyed, dismantled or turned over to civilian purposes, and should not be integrated into other weapon systems or redeployed in other regions.

It is the common aspiration of all countries to reduce armaments and diminish the danger of war. All countries, big or small, strong or weak, enjoy equal rights on the question of security and are entitled to take part in the discussion and settlement of security and disarmament questions.

(Mr. Qian, China)

Disarmament efforts on a bilateral or small-scale basis are welcome. However, they should not replace global scale multilateral disarmament efforts. All these efforts should promote and supplement each other.

It is an important part of China's independent foreign policy of peace to oppose the arms race and strive for disarmament. It is our consistent view that all kinds of arms race, whatever category of weapons it may involve, be it on land or at sea, on Earth or in outer space, should be halted.

Looking into the next decade, we find nuclear disarmament undoubtedly still an issue of paramount importance. China has all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Experience has shown that to achieve this objective the United States and the Soviet Union, which possess the largest nuclear arsenals, should assume a special responsibility and obligation to take the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and drastically cut all types of nuclear weapons deployed at home and abroad. The tangible progress they make in these fields will create conditions for convening a broadly representative international conference on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. To this end, we hope that the United States and the Soviet Union will, through negotiations, effectively cut at least 50 per cent of their enormous nuclear arsenals, including sea-launched and air-launched cruise missiles, as well as tactical nuclear weapons, and proceed on this basis to cut their nuclear weapons by a bigger margin. All the nuclear weapons thus cut should be destroyed and the nuclear warheads duly disposed of. The reductions should not be confined merely to the nuclear weapons on their territories and in Europe, but should also include those deployed by them in Asia and the Pacific. This would contribute to peace and security in all regions of the world.

The presence of nuclear weapons in the world, even for a single day, calls for the adoption of measures to prevent nuclear war. The extremely limited number of nuclear weapons China possesses is solely for the purpose of self-defence. We have never shirked our responsibility, and since the very first day that China came into possession of nuclear weapons, we have unilaterally undertaken that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons. It is our view that if all countries possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, that in itself will be a highly effective measure for the prevention of nuclear war and a powerful impetus to the nuclear disarmament process. China hereby proposes that negotiations should be started at the earliest date in the Conference on Disarmament for the conclusion of an international agreement banning the first use of nuclear weapons under agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war".

In the current international circumstances, China holds that it is high time to consider another important measure for the prevention of nuclear war: all nuclear-weapon States that have deployed nuclear weapons abroad, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, should pull back all these weapons to their own territories. It is obvious that this measure, once taken, will not only help enhance trust among nations and reduce the risk of nuclear war, but also promote international efforts towards the prevention of nuclear proliferation.

(Mr. Qian, China)

For the purpose of maintaining world peace and promoting the security of all nations, China does not advocate, encourage or engage in nuclear proliferation. In its co-operation with other countries in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy China has adopted a responsible attitude, requiring the recipient countries of its nuclear exports to accept IAEA safeguards and ensuring that its own nuclear imports are for peaceful purposes. At the same time, we are opposed to the practice of going all out for the nuclear arms race in both quantity and quality while imposing unreasonable restrictions on international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the pretext of preventing nuclear proliferation. In 1988 the Chinese Government signed a unilateral submission agreement with IAEA to place a part of its nuclear energy installations under the Agency's safeguards. We are now giving favourable consideration to sending an observer delegation to the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is scheduled for this August.

China understands the urgent desire of the third world countries and the non-nuclear-weapon States for a comprehensive nuclear test ban at an early date. It has always exercised the utmost restraint and prudence towards nuclear tests, and has conducted only a very limited number of such tests. We will continue to do so in the future. It is our position that the objective of a comprehensive nuclear test ban should be reached in the context of an effective nuclear disarmament process. The United States and the Soviet Union have conducted the most nuclear tests, amounting to about 1,600 to date. Therefore, they have the obligation to take the lead in halting all nuclear tests and carrying out nuclear disarmament so as to create conditions for a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. The Chinese delegation is ready to join in the work of the ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban as soon as it is established by the CD. The Chinese departments concerned and experts are studying the technical aspects of the international seismological data exchange experiment, and positively considering participation in it, so as to accumulate experience for the future establishment of an effective international verification mechanism for a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

China has held all along that, in parallel to nuclear disarmament, great importance should be attached to conventional disarmament. In the process of conventional disarmament, countries that possess the largest conventional arsenals should assume a special responsibility. The early conclusion of an agreement between them and other member States of the two major military alliances on drastic conventional force reductions will contribute to peace and security in Europe and the world as a whole. Meanwhile, all countries should be encouraged to make greater efforts and take concrete steps to advance conventional disarmament to the extent that their security and necessary defence capabilities are guaranteed.

For years China has worked for conventional disarmament by taking concrete actions. From 1985 to 1987 China unilaterally cut the size of its troops by 1 million. In terms of the number of troops, this was the largest disarmament move the world witnessed in the 1980s. China's military expenditure has all along been kept at a very low level. For example, its defence budget for 1989 was 24,550 million yuan renminbi, accounting for 8.4 per cent of its government budget and less than 2 per cent of its GNP for

(Mr. Qian, China)

the year. China's annual per capita military expenditure is less than 5 United States dollars, a figure not only lower than that of any of the big countries in the world but also lower than that of many small countries.

China has never set up any military base or stationed any soldiers outside its territory. It has always opposed the stationing of troops and the establishment of military bases abroad by any country. Now it is high time to drastically reduce and ultimately completely remove all troops stationed, military bases established and all types of weapons deployed on foreign soil. Not long ago an armed invasion of Panama was launched. This act of aggression has drawn condemnation from people throughout the world. We hold that all foreign aggressor troops and armies of occupation anywhere in the world should be withdrawn immediately without any pre-conditions.

Progress in nuclear and conventional disarmament has made disarmament in outer space and at sea an increasingly prominent issue. China holds that all countries with space capabilities, especially the major Powers in this field, should take prompt measures to prevent and halt the arms race in outer space, starting with the complete prohibition of space weapons. The existing international legal instruments relating to outer space, notwithstanding their positive role, are far from adequate to prevent weapons from entering outer space. We therefore support negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of an international agreement to ensure a weapon-free outer space.

The naval arms race between the super-Powers not only involves nuclear and conventional weapons but also affects the peace in seas and oceans, as well as global security and stability. Even today, the spectre of the anachronistic "gunboat policy" still menaces some small and medium-sized countries from time to time. Therefore, in the process of disarmament one cannot but devote attention to naval arms reductions. It is our view that the United States and the Soviet Union should stop their naval arms expansion forthwith and substantially reduce their navies.

China, as a non-chemical-weapon State that has historically suffered immensely from the scourge of chemical weapons, has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of CW and the early conclusion of a convention to this effect, so that the world will be genuinely free from chemical weapons. This year and the next will be of vital importance to the negotiations for a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union have now indicated their intention to cut their chemical weapons by a big margin. This is a welcome development. In our view the key to the final solution of the problem of chemical weapons lies in the total destruction of existing chemical weapons at the earliest date by the countries possessing the largest chemical arsenals, and moreover in their refraining from producing or developing new types of chemical weapons.

With regard to the verification régime in the future convention on CW, our basic position is that we are in favour of an effective, reasonable and feasible verification régime under the convention, including challenge inspection. In the mean time we maintain that challenge inspection should not go beyond the purposes, objectives and scope of the convention, and that its

(Mr. Qian, China)

possible abuse must be strictly guarded against. Specific provisions should ensure a balance between the rights and obligations of the requesting State on the one hand and those of the requested State on the other, and give full play to the role of the future organization.

China has always had a prudent and responsible approach to the export of weapons, and the volume of such exports is extremely limited. In this connection, the principles we strictly follow are: Firstly, such exports should be conducive to the strengthening of the legitimate defence capabilities of the countries concerned. Secondly, they should be conducive to the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and stability in the regions concerned. Thirdly, the export of weapons is not to be used as a means to interfere in other countries' internal affairs. We hope that other countries will follow the same principles in arms exports and in particular impose a strict ban on all forms of arms transfers to those countries or régimes that perpetrate aggression and expansion against or military occupation of other countries or practise apartheid or colonial rule. We are in favour of reasonable regulation and restriction of international arms transfers. If the United States, the Soviet Union and some NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries whose arms transfers account for over 90 per cent of the world total can take concrete and effective measures of self-restraint, they will undoubtedly contribute to the enhancement of world peace and security.

The Chinese Government attaches importance to the relationship between disarmament and development. China started early in the conversion of military industries on a large scale, which has since yielded rapid and significant results. It is part and parcel of China's national development strategy to use its military technologies and capabilities for peaceful purposes and to incorporate its military industrial capacity in a planned way into national economic development. In the 10 years since 1979, China has allocated substantial development funds to military enterprises for the purpose of improving their technological conversion to civilian production and transferring military technologies to the civilan sector. As a result, new civilian products have increased to the tune of 11 billion yuan renminbi in terms of total annual output value. In 1979, the output value of civilian products accounted for 8.1 per cent of the gross output value of military enterprises in China; today the figure is two thirds. Research and production departments in military industries are engaged in active research on key State civilian projects and the production of capital equipment, and are energetically assisting major State development industries such as energy, transport, etc. They have not only supplied many urgently needed products for national economic development and solved numerous technical problems, but also produced a large number of light industrial products and other consumer goods, thus boosting the domestic market. A total of nearly 30,000 items resulting from scientific and technological innovations used exclusively for military purposes in the past are now open to civilian uses. Our experience shows that conversion and development through disarmament are both realistic and practical. We will continue to move in this direction, and we are ready to exchange experience with other countries and jointly explore ways and means of converting military technologies and capabilities.

(Mr. Qian, China)

People throughout the world want peace, not war - relaxation, not tension - stability, not turbulence. Though closely linked with peace, disarmament alone is not sufficient to guarantee peace. In the past few years the military confrontation between the super-Powers has eased, and there has been a growing tendency towards seeking political settlement of regional conflicts through dialogue by the parties concerned. This is a welcome development. However, in reality, the international situation remains tense and turbulent. What particularly merits the attention of the international community is that in inter-State relations there are still frequent cases of interference in other countries' internal affairs by political, economic, cultural and ideological means, pushing peaceful evolution in other countries or even imposing one's own will on other countries by force. Hegemonism and power politics, though repeatedly rebuffed, stubbornly refuse to quit the historical scene. The sovereignty, independence and security of many countries, small and weak countries in particular, are still subject to serious threats. There will be no tranquility in the world if this issue remains unsettled. Likewise, the question of development, which cannot be separated from that of peace, deserves the serious concern of the international community. The unjust international economic order has led to a worsening economic situation in numerous developing countries, as evidenced by heavier debt burdens, reversed financial flows to the developed countries and the widening North-South gap in terms of economic well-being. Failure to solve these problems is detrimental to world peace, security and stability.

The world is a complex one. Recent critics have often described the complex and fluid world situation as bewildering. However, looking beneath the kaleidoscopic surface, one can see clearly that the people of all countries strongly aspire to peace and development. In the final analysis, world peace is indivisible, and security in each region and country is equally important. Safeguarding global security and ensuring the progress of all countries are the most important goals in the 1990s and indeed in the twenty-first century. To attain this goal, it is imperative in international relations to abide universally by the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. On this basis it is essential to establish a just and rational new international political and economic order that conforms to the fundamental interests of all countries. This is the way to safeguard world peace and the security of all countries effectively and provide a solid foundation for the cause of disarmament.

China is a socialist country, and a developing country as well. It always pursues an independent foreign policy of peace, and is unswervingly carrying out a policy of reform and opening up. The Chinese people, who underwent untold sufferings as a result of foreign aggression and the scourge of war in the past, are today working hard for the socialist modernization of their country. To achieve this goal will require the arduous efforts of several generations and a lasting peaceful international environment.

The 1990s will be a decade of opportunities and challenges and of hopes and dangers, all existing side by side. Despite the twists and turns on our road of advance, we are convinced that through the unremitting joint efforts of all Governments and peoples, peace can be preserved, and that the prospects for mankind will be bright.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Exellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of China for his important statement and for the kind words that he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Kosin.

Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on the excellent work you have accomplished as President of the Conference for the current month. The ampleness of successful consultations you have undertaken to secure progress in our deliberations has made it possible for the Conference to engage, from the very beginning, in essential work. I also thank the distinguished Ambassador El Ghali Benhima of Morocco for so efficiently presiding over the Conference during a very active August and the inter-sessional period. In addition, I congratulate His Excellency Mr. Qian Qichen, the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, for his comprehensive and very thoughtful statement to our Conference.

I would like to welcome among us our colleagues who have arrived since my last statement to the Conference: Ambassador Warnasena Rasaputram of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Thomas Ariba Ogada of Kenya, Ambassador Andrea Negrotto Cambiaso of Italy, Ambassador José Pérez Novoa of Cuba, Ambassador Hou Zhitong of China, Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki of Japan, Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada, Ambassador Roberto García Moritán of Argentina, Ambassador Horacio Arteaga of Venezuela, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar of the United States of America and Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico. I would like to assure them of my delegation's active co-operation.

I wish to bid farewell to Ambassador Taylhardat, Ambassador Marchand, Ambassador Friedersdorf, Ambasaddor Dolgu, Ambassador Vajnar, Ambassador García Robles. Our delegation expresses to all of them our best wishes for the future. I would like to take advantage of this occasion and once again recall how much we owe to Don Alfonso, whose interests and achievements in the field of disarmament have been highly acclaimed. My delegation would like to pay homage to his unyielding commitment to disarmament objectives.

We join other delegations in the deep sorrow for the premature loss of Miss Annie Rebuzzi, and kindly ask the Secretariat to transmit to her parents our sincerest condolences.

In terms of time we are on the threshold of the last decade of this century while, in essence, we are perhaps at the beginning of a new era in which many of the postulates of international relations are being challenged. We may have different views as to how to assess this stage of development, in many ways a dramatic one. The least we could say is that disarmament is playing an increasingly active role not only in shaping the security order or influencing the resolution of key world issues, but also in the emergence of a new concept of international relations.

On a more concrete level, we are entering a year with more well-founded expectations for a movement from arms control to genuine disarmament, with clearer stands as to the goals of negotiations, with more specific proposals as to the means of their accomplishment, and a more precise time framework as regards the conclusion of the three most important negotiating undertakings.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

I am referring to the strategic arms reduction treaty (START), the reduction of troops and arms in Europe and the conclusion of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and their destruction.

These somewhat more optimistic expectations stem from the profound changes in social and international relations in the past year, in many ways giving a particular character to post-war development in the world. Without going deep into the essence of these processes, we can say that they have already been reflected in the easing and removal of various barriers between nations and States, barriers which were becoming ever more artificial, intolerable and unacceptable. A series of political events gave strong impetus to the understanding and strengthening of these positive trends.

The ninth summit of heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries evolved in this atmosphere. This highly representative gathering noted that the positive global trends in the world were creating favourable conditions for reaching a consensus on a break with the arms race, competition between blocs, subjugation of nations, racial discrimination and the violation of human rights, instigation of regional conflicts, monopolization of security negotiations, and so forth. At the same time, it voiced firm demands for a global resolution of disarmament, security, economic development and other crucial world issues, with the participation of the entire international community. What we are witnessing today is actually a confirmation of the anticipated concepts of the policy of non-alignment in a more unified and more interdependent international community. The summit focused on all aspects of disarmament, starting from the urgent task of delivering the world from nuclear danger by way of nuclear disarmament. In this context it gave strong support to the Conference on Disarmament as the only multilateral negotiating forum. The summit also stated that disarmament prospects should be constantly broadened and that all countries should have an adequate opportunity in negotiations. It strongly expressed the readiness of non-aligned countries to take upon themselves their share of responsibility.

Of particular importance were the numerous summit and ministerial meetings between the United States and the USSR, which renewed their commitment towards disarmament and their intention of making this year a year of tangible achievements.

As a European non-aligned country we are particularly encouraged by the evolution of facts, events and ideas on our continent. Yugoslavia invested 30 years of efforts in overcoming the bloc-based and other divisions on European soil and embedding into European relations principles which are now being confirmed as the foundations of the inter-European and broader international system. Together with the non-aligned and neutral countries, Yugoslavia made an acknowledged contribution to the development of the concept of confidence-building and security-building measures in Europe. We are convinced that the present socio-political and economic evolution is creating favourable conditions not only for improving East-West relations but also for Europe's decisive contribution to the global security of all countries as a co-operative démarche. Despite numerous old and new contradictions, Europe has taken the road of gradually increasing mutual security and economic political co-operation.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

This positive evolution, which has not yet spread to all the regions or covered all key issues, is giving birth to a new concept of international security and stability. The role of the military element is declining and economic and humanitarian factors are gaining ground. This is creating favourable conditions for disarmament and challenging military-strategic doctrines based on the arms race.

Promising prospects in bilateral and regional negotiations in Europe should not diminish but, on the contrary, strengthen the role of our Conference. Our effort here is much more than a mere confirmation of collective responsibility in solving the problems of disarmament and security. With no intention of drawing artificial lines between different negotiating methods and forums, we see multilateralism as a complementary, but also as an inevitable process in the overall efforts without which no security order can be either stable or permanent. Besides, the most important issues in the field of disarmament simply cannot be dealt with only in the framework of strategic stability among the most powerful countries as a substitute for security for all. This is why we are striving to ensure that the substantive work of the Conference embraces all disarmament issues. This work will clearly vary depending on the readiness of certain issues to be resolved. In order to meet its goals fully and use all its potentialities, the Conference must engage in a profound and critical examination of the ways in which it is fulfilling its role, including its agenda, organization and functioning, with a speedier adjustment to the changes outside the Conference.

Without neglecting any of the issues, in the immediate future we see three priority areas on which our efforts should be focused. I would begin with the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons as a most immediately attainable task. Its accomplishment would give our Conference, and the multilateral negotiations as well, unparalleled impetus. In this domain the Conference is, in many ways, doing a pioneer's job in creating a new model of international co-operation and communication in the scientific, technical, legal, political, economic and, of course, security fields.

As regards the work before us, we believe that the following are the key points. First, international political consensus has been significantly strengthened, together with an explicit pledge regarding the conclusion of a comprehensive convention as soon as possible. This was the outcome of the Conference in Paris, the United Nations resolutions, the ninth summit of the non-aligned countries, the bilateral contacts between the two biggest chemical weapons possessors, the talks with chemical industry representatives in Canberra, etc.

Second, there has been a fundamental rapproachment of views on the relativity of the military efficiency of chemical weapons. We have proof of this in agreements on the destruction of the bulk of the two big Powers' stockpiles, as well as the ever-increasing recognition that the possession of chemical weapons offers only an illusion of security.

Third, we are in the process of a continuous covergence of views on many important technical and political issues, including the essential verification aspects. It may be said that we now have an outline of the structure of the convention, and that even for more important controversial issues we can discern an infrastructure of political convergence.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

Fourth, international conditions for accelerating negotiations have never been so favourable, as is demonstrated by the parallel negotiations on strategic, nuclear and conventional disarmament which are entering their final stage.

Fifth, from what is known of the degree of agreement in the American-Soviet bilateral negotiations, they can represent a significant impulse. We expect it to be directly reflected at the Conference on Disarmament. We also hope to get more fundamental information, in particular on all aspects connected with the elimination of all stocks of chemical weapons. These weapons must be permanently eliminated and their legalization cannot be accepted on any pretext, least of all through unilateral withdrawal from the convention.

We do not underestimate the difficulties and differences when speaking of such matters as verification, inspection (in particular challenge inspection), technological co-operation, the composition and method of decision-making of the Executive Council, etc. We are not neglecting the complexity of these difficulties, but we believe they can be solved quickly if we keep in mind the high level of political accord reached on basic aspects. We have in mind, above all, the fact that an effective verification system is taking shape, be it a question of routine inspection or ad hoc verification of chemical facilities. The development of the challenge inspection procedure and the verification of CW destruction has progressed well. In dealing with the inspection issues as a whole, it is essential to commence with the common interest of all States parties in establishing the facts by way of inspection, while the rest is logically a matter of the functioning of the mechanism which should ensure consistent implementation of the convention. One of the most important tasks is to provide for a complete ban on the use of chemical weapons during the 10-year transitional period following the entry into force of the convention. We regret that, although strongly reiterated in the Paris Declaration, the question of the prohibition of use has not been introduced in the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee.

The composition of the Executive Council and the decision-making process in it are among the important unresolved and, as yet, least elaborated questions. It seems that the starting-point for solving these questions should be that the implementation of the convention will presuppose full co-operation on the part of the Executive Council with all the States parties, which underlines its operational and co-ordinative role. We think it also important to establish adequate communication with the United Nations.

Of great concern, however, is the fact that the problem of the security of non-aligned and under-developed countries, especially when dealing with technological co-operation and assistance in the event of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, is not being given sufficient attention. It is not necessary to keep on proving that countries which do not possess chemical weapons, or have renounced them, will for a long time be in an unequal economic and security position. To solve these issues it is essential to state the principles of co-operation and solidarity. Universal accession to the convention can be achieved only if it becomes a truly multilateral instrument that respects the quality of all its members, with an efficient and cost-effective implementation mechanism.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

Certain reservations already expressed as to the possibility that not all States will become parties to the convention seem somewhat premature - all the more so as this is the very purpose of the general endeavours of the Conference, including the participation of non-member States. A proposal still on the table concerning universal accession to the convention is that offered by the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia at SSOD-III for the convening of an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations.

We do not want to underestimate the proliferation issue, but we hold the strong conviction that it can be solved only by the conclusion of a convention which would meet the needs of all countries.

We are of the opinion that conditions to accelerate the otherwise slow negotiations are improving. Therefore, besides a political decision, we need to focus on those problems which our Conference must and should resolve, and leave the other to organs yet to be created. The Committee, under the expert and dynamic leadership of Ambassador Morel, has gone a long way in clarifying many issues. We believe that as of now we could fix a time frame for the conclusion of the convention which would significantly stimulate the negotiations that have been going on for too long now. We are fully confident that Ambassador Hyltenius, with his knowledge and experience, will do all he can to have the controversial issues resolved as soon as possible.

My delegation attaches high priority to the issue of nuclear tests. We support the positive efforts being made in bilateral negotiations, which should evolve towards a comprehensive agreement. We are, however, of the view that without a total nuclear test ban the nuclear arms race would be nurtured even by tests on the lowest level. We are firmly in favour of more active involvement by the Conference on this issue by way of the establishment of an Ad hoc Committee. The proposal for the convening of a conference to amend the PTBT is an indispensable effort towards joint action by the international community. We must always keep in mind that constructive dealing with this issue strengthens the non-proliferation régime. Any marginalization of Conference activities on nuclear issues is unacceptable, nuclear disarmament having by its very definition a universal character. Also, we cannot neglect the fact that the proliferation of missile technology, which we are increasingly being warned about, is primarily an important component of the nuclear arms race. It is now being acknowledged that in order to solve these issues, multilateral efforts are indispensable and hence require the strengthening of the role of the Conference on Disarmament.

It is commonplace to say that outer space is the heritage of all mankind. It must therefore remain a domain for exclusively peaceful co-operation which is of invaluable benefit to all countries. This is why it is of vital importance to disarmament, to economic development and to scientific progress to prevent an arms race in outer space. To date the Conference has performed useful work on identifying and clarifying the various aspects of this complex item. It has before it numerous proposals aimed at supplementing and elaborating upon the existing legal régime, which should continually be strengthened. The Conference must urgently fulfil its role in the elaboration of new instruments of a legal character which would, in an

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

all-embracing and multilateral way, tackle the issue of the non-militarization of outer space. The Conference cannot renounce pursuit of the achievement of meaningful measures in the search for effective solutions. That there should be a timely reaction to this can be seen from the statement made in the plenary of the Conference that United States-Soviet bilateral negotiations are "based upon a mutual recognition that there is no absolute weapon - offensive or defensive". This clearly indicates the negative consequences of deployment of any weapons in outer space. This is also recognized to be an urgent issue, as an increasing number of countries are becoming technologically capable of conquering outer space, in which only military activity aimed at verifying disarmament treaties could be useful. The urgent elaboration of a system of confidence-building measures would clear the way for essential steps towards preventing the arms race.

Instead of a conclusion, I would like to underline that we should be cautious with easy-handed prophecies. We can certainly discern on the horizon the contours of new approaches to the political and security order, but we cannot underestimate the contradictions that can make this evolution fragile. We should not overlook the fact that a key area of the qualitative arms race still remains untouched: how to monitor, through co-operation, the use of new armaments-oriented technologies. We must also keep in mind that the most important global economic, socio-humanitarian, ecological and other issues have hardly been tackled.

It is clear that what is happening today is much more than détente in East-West relations. The changes are much deeper and more all-embracing. The movement towards a peaceful world has been speeded up, yet all the roads leading to a stable global structure have not been cleared. The changes in the world are still asymmetrical and lessons have so far been drawn unevenly from our experience. The results achieved are only a beginning. Nevertheless, prospects for faster and greater breakthroughs here at this Conference are more real. This is why we should commence this year not only with new expectations but also with renewed efforts towards more daring achievements. We can accomplish this if the positive evolution of East-West relations is spread to all fields of international life, all issues, all countries. It is precisely in this respect that there still remains a series of dilemmas stemming primarily from the North-South gap in development, generating deeper inequalities. Without the resolution of this problem there can be no stability in the world.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): First, let me express my deep appreciation for the gracious welcome members of this group have given to me. It gives me added encouragement about the prospect for accelerating progress in our work. I was honoured by President Bush's appointment to represent the United States at this Conference, and I am pleased to be here. I look forward to working closely and co-operatively with you on the many issues we have before us.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

Mr. President, as the first order of business in my first formal statement to the Conference, I would like to join those who have already congratulated you upon your assumption of the presidency during this important first month of our 1990 session, and I extend best wishes to you in your new capacity as the CD representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Under your able leadership we have gotten off to a smooth start. The United States delegation assures you of its continued support and co-operation.

May I also express the appreciation of my delegation for the visit here today of Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen? We have carefully noted the various points the Minister made, any advice he gave to us and to others in his most interesting intervention.

Since the CD concluded its 1989 session, the pace of arms control and disarmament negotiations has quickened at all levels - bilateral, regional, and multilateral. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze have met several times. These meetings have produced agreement on a number of arms control issues that we hope will help pave the way for progress on many fronts. Activities have not been limited, however, to bilateral meetings. Recently in Vienna the NATO countries have tabled yet again a series of new proposals to expedite early agreement on conventional force reductions in Europe. Also in the Vienna negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures, military leaders of the European countries, United States and Canada, have concluded earlier this month an unprecedented exchange of views on military doctrine, including on force structure, and military training. In Ottawa, the 23 countries of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization have come together to begin consideration of modalities for opening their skies to reciprocal, unarmed aerial surveillance flights, conducted on a routine basis - another great step towards increased openness and transparency. And in our own area, last September the Canberra Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons brought together for the first time large numbers of government officials and chemical industry representatives.

As many speakers before me at this session have already noted, we are living in a time of profound change and opportunity. In our Conference, we have new possibilities to consolidate change and transition to a more peaceful world. It is our responsibility to seize these opportunities and make the most of them, and - if we can - to undertake new, binding commitments that can enhance global stability and security.

There are, of course, still disturbing trends. My Government, for example, is deeply concerned at the current proliferation of technologies that threaten peace and can lead to regional instabilities. We still have much to do. The Conference on Disarmament, as a multilateral negotiating body with representation from all regions of the globe, must continue to play its vital role.

Among the issues on the CD's agenda, the negotiation on a comprehensive, multilateral chemical weapons convention is a particularly high priority for the United States and others. President Bush is personally committed to the achievement of a chemical weapons convention at the earliest date, and you are

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

aware of the intense interest of the United States Congress as well. The United States has taken pioneering steps in the past on chemical weapons, presenting a draft treaty in this body in 1984, proposing mandatory challenge inspection, and releasing extensive information on the composition and location of United States CW stockpiles and production facilities.

Without in the least slighting the other important work of this Conference, I wish today in accord with rule 30 to address the CW issue as it appears from the United States' perspective. I look forward to addressing other issues on our agenda in a subsequent statement.

Since arriving in Geneva, I have heard recurrent criticism of the slow pace of work on the chemical weapons convention. Some say the political commitment made at Paris and Canberra last year has not been matched by efforts to resolve the remaining issues on a CW ban.

There may be some measure of short-term truth to this criticism, but for the most part it is a gross exaggeration. I think that many of us are so engrossed in our work that we are not seeing the forest for the trees. The scope and technical and political complexity of this convention are unprecedented. Many of the issues now before us are the difficult ones set aside in the past in favour of dealing with the more readily soluble issues.

It is easy to see just the trees - the sheer weight of detailed work needed to formulate the CW convention. We have to stand back to see the forest - that is, how far we have already come. We must not let political haste to get a convention lessen our commitment to a convention that will truly enhance security and that will work in practice. Our success won't be judged by how quickly we reach agreement but whether our legislatures and our people decide their national security interests have been met, and whether the treaty can be effectively implemented and verified.

The firm commitment of the United States to a multilateral, effectively verifiable CW convention has taken several forms. A very important one is our work with the USSR.

Convinced that greater openness can contribute to the prospects for an early multilateral convention, the United States and Soviet Union signed a memorandum of understanding in Wyoming in September 1989 regarding a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange. These significant steps will occur in two phases. Phase one, already under way, involves the exchange of general data on each side's chemical weapons capabilities and a series of visits to relevant military and civil facilities on our respective territories. The initial exchange took place on 29 December 1989. In phase two the sides will exchange more detailed data and permit on-site inspections to verify the accuracy of the information exchanged.

In addition to the increased confidence gained from such exchanges of data, visits and inspections, we believe the inspection experience gained, drawing largely on multilateral provisions elaborated to date in the "rolling text", will contribute much to our work here in the CD as we further elaborate and finalize such provisions for the convention.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

The sides also agreed in Wyoming to undertake a co-operative effort with respect to the destruction of chemical weapons. We agreed to reciprocal visits to monitor destruction operations of each other's side, and to the exchange of information on past, current and planned destruction activities and procedures.

To facilitate the entry into force of the convention at the earliest possible date, President Bush proposed in his 25 September United Nations speech that the United States and the Soviet Union begin to destroy a major portion of their CW stocks even before the convention enters into force. We believe this commitment would give an impetus to rapid completion of the convention. In this connection, I am pleased to be able to inform my colleagues that the United States, in a unilateral action completed just a few weeks ago, has now destroyed its entire stockpile of the incapacitating chemical weapon BZ. I will be providing more detail on this destruction later.

The United States no longer insists that all CW-capable States be parties to the convention from the beginning. Provided the Soviet Union is party to the convention, the United States will become a party at the outset. By year 8, we will have destroyed down to 2 per cent - that is, down to one forty-ninth - of our current stockpile. I want to emphasize and to make clear to the experts here that President Bush's proposal will require significantly faster and deeper United States and Soviet cuts than currently envisioned in the draft convention text.

The United States would destroy the remaining 2 per cent by year 10 of the convention provided that all CW-capable States have become parties.

There is already broad agreement in this body that to be effective a CW convention must include all States of concern. Our proposal is an effort to address this issue in a way that does not delay entry into force of the convention.

The 2 per cent residual is intended to provide an incentive to hold-out States to become parties to the convention. All States that join the convention must do their utmost to bring pressure to bear on any CW-capable States that remain outside.

We have already made substantial progress in implementing aspects of President Bush's initiative. Recently, the United States and Soviet Union agreed at the ministerial in Moscow to work out a bilateral agreement on reciprocal obligations pending the international convention including, inter alia, the destruction of the bulk of our CW stocks to equal low levels. The objective is to complete and sign such an agreement at the June 1990 Bush-Gorbachev summit meeting.

Incidentally, all of the United States-USSR documents I have cited have been presented by both our delegations in the English and Russian versions for circulation by the secretariat as CD documents.

The United States and the Soviet Union just last week began another round of bilateral discussions, which are concentrating on preparing the agreement for the June summit meeting and on implementation of the Wyoming memorandum of understanding.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

The United States shares the concern of many delegations about ensuring undiminished security during the period of transition to a world in which such chemical weapons no longer exist. We believe that the security concerns of all CD participants with regard to this period, as well as after, must be met in order to achieve the universality we seek.

In this regard, it is essential that States be just as candid about their own chemical weapons capabilities as they are quick to criticize those who admit to having them.

The way we see it, there is good news and bad news. There are more than 20 States that have or are seeking chemical weapons. The bad news is that only two States - the United States and USSR - have admitted to having a chemical weapon programme or capability, and some States have even falsely denied it. The good news is that a large number of delegations from States with CW programmes or intentions are present here in this room today and are participating in the CW negotiations, and thus have an opportunity to make a concrete contribution to progress. Here I address myself to the co-ordinators of the regional groups that represent more than 20 chemical-weapon-capable States here in this chamber. When they feel the need to give advice in the name of their groups to the United States and, I imagine, also to the Soviet Union, they should bear in mind, as we do, that they speak also on behalf of at least several CW-capable States.

In addition to the issue of undiminished security, the programme of work for 1990 outlined by the Chairman of the CW Ad hoc Committee lays before us a number of other very important technical and political issues. My delegation will actively participate in the attempt to find solutions to these issues as well.

Work will be taken up on procedures to investigate alleged use, provisions for ad hoc verification and guidelines for initial inspections. With regard to verification of alleged use, Canada and Norway, as well as the United Nations Secretary-General's expert group, have done much good work on this issue. The United States is pleased to hear of both the interest expressed in an ad hoc verification régime and the desire to take up this issue soon. We hope to provide the Conference with a proposal to break the deadlock on this subject in the very near future. With regard to guidelines for initial inspections, a number of CD documents on national trial inspections have highlighted the need for such guidelines. We agree that they are needed and work should be undertaken to develop such guidelines.

The work programme also addresses the order of destruction, technical criteria such as production capacity and thresholds, and guidelines for schedule 1. As noted in the Wyoming joint statement, the United States and Soviet Union have agreed on some procedures governing the order of destruction of chemical weapons negotiations. Our approach will be introduced into the CW negotiations very soon.

The United States has tabled papers on the issues of production capacity and thresholds and has participated in the development of the production capacity paper now in appendix II. We believe this material is a useful basis

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

for discussion. We also hope for progress on the guidelines for schedule 1, but note that it is difficult to finalize such guidelines until the scope of schedule 1 is agreed.

Another important area of the work programme is the question of amendments. Much work must be done before agreement can be reached on procedures for amending the convention. We must also find ways to change less fundamental aspects of the convention by a mechanism less formal than an amendment procedure.

As I mentioned earlier, a number of the remaining issues are the most difficult, of great importance to all delegations and directly linked to the effective operation of the convention. Two such issues on our agenda this year - challenge inspection and the Executive Council - have eluded solutions for years. While we have made some progress in narrowing the focus on the unresolved aspects of these issues, much work remains to be done to meet the needs and concerns of all parties.

I have spent some time trying to outline the progress made to date on CW because I believe it is important for all of us to not lose sight of the substantial work that has been accomplished. At the same time, we still have some of the most thorny issues ahead of us. We must not slacken our pace, but we must continue to take the time required to develop provisions that will create a durable and universal convention that will enhance security while ridding the world of a class of weapons we all regard as abhorrent.

Thank you, Mr. President and colleagues, for bearing with me while I have attempted to share my thoughts and hopes with you. I can promise that you will always find my delegation candid and direct in explaining our position, and always ready to roll up our sleeves and work hard with you toward the vital goals of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement, and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Loeis.

Mr. LOEIS (Indonesia): Mr. President, I would like to preface my statement by associating myself with previous speakers who have congratulated you on your taking up the post of President of the Conference for the month of February. It is indeed a source of satisfaction to the Indonesian delegation to see the representative of a country with which Indonesia has very close relations presiding over our deliberations. I also wish to pledge the preparedness of my delegation to fully co-operate with you in the dispatch of our common duties. Let me also avail myself of this opportunity to express the appreciation of my delegation to your predecessor, Ambassador El Ghali Benhima of Morocco, for his commendable chairmanship of the Conference during the month of August 1989 and in the inter-sessional period.

It is a great pleasure for my delegation to have the distinguished Foreign Minister of China, His Excellency Qian Qichen, among us today. His important statement has enriched our deliberations, since he touched upon

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

many of the issues under discussion in this Conference. I would also like to join previous speakers in warmly welcoming to the Conference Ambassador Andrea Negrotto Cambiaso of Italy, Ambassador José Pérez Novoa of Cuba, Ambassador Hou Zhitong of China, Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki of Japan, Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada, Ambassador Roberto García Moritán of Argentina, Ambassador Horacio Arteaga of Venezuela, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar of the United States of America, Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico, Mr. Zdenek Pagac of Czechoslovakia and Dr. Gheorghe Chirila of Romania. My delegation looks forward to continued co-operation with the delegations now under their respective heads. At the same time, to those Ambassadors who have recently concluded their functions in the Conference, I would also like to wish all success in their future undertakings. My delegation would also like to join other delegations in expressing distress and sorrow at the untimely loss of Miss Annie Rebuzzi.

The Conference on Disarmament this year starts its spring session at a watershed where great changes in international relations have just begun. The growing disposition toward conciliation and accommodation among States, especially between the major Powers, appears to be a promising realism, easing international tension in many parts of the world. I am persuaded that the long and most aggravating chapters in East-West relations are drawing to a close. The contrast with the sombre, even despairing mood of disarmament efforts in the past is striking, since the road blocks which for many years now have impeded passage on the way to disarmament seem to have been removed.

It has come to our attention that an agreement between the super-Powers on 50 per cent cuts in strategic weapons is under way, and an agreement on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe is expected to materialize this year. Moreover, quite a number of countries in both East and West - including the two super-Powers - are now taking unilateral steps to restructure their military forces with a view to reducing military tension in Europe.

In the multilateral disarmament forums, however, progress is still too slow to record any measure in curbing the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race.

In pursuit of a de-escalation of the nuclear arms race, no measure would have such a decisive impact as a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon testing. Despite all the solemn reaffirmations of obligations stipulated in the existing treaties, no tangible result has been forthcoming in attaining this paramount objective. Efforts to conclude a treaty to comprehensively ban nuclear testing have been obstructed on political and technical grounds and, at this Conference, consideration of this issue has long been blocked by procedural difficulties. It is regrettable, therefore, that our deliberations on one of the priority items of the Conference for over a decade has not produced any result.

In spring 1989 my delegation questioned how the Conference had been able to set up an Ad hoc Committee on item 1 in 1982-1983 but had failed to do so in 1988 and 1989, when the world political climate showed a degree of improvement. I believe this question is still cogent. Today, when new

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

political ideas surface and concordance has gradually overruled confrontation, there should be no impediment preventing the Conference from setting up a Committee with a mandate to negotiate a treaty to comprehensively ban nuclear testing.

We have acknowledged in the past that negotiations to draw up a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty have not been possible due to the inadequacy of the state of the art of verification. We were told that tests are needed to ensure the reliability of the existing arsenals. Now I am wondering if these two assertions are going to be elucidated to take the following into account. Firstly, the great strides which have been made in science and technology could, in my view, erase any technical impediment in monitoring compliance with a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. Secondly, the leaders of the super-powers have professed recently that the two States are entering a new era of relations. For this reason, I doubt that there is still the necessity for them to ensure the reliability of their existing nuclear arsenals. As just pointed out by Ambassador Marko Kosin of Yugoslavia in his statement, the heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries reiterated, inter alia, at their recently concluded summit meeting that "the immediate suspension and comprehensive ban on nuclear tests remained one of the highest priorities of nuclear disarmament". They further mentioned that the ongoing process of disarmament could be quickened and its coverage widened through the common endeavour of the entire international community. We should therefore tackle all aspects of the test ban issue in a concrete manner, because further procrastination could harm not only the cause of a comprehensive test ban but also confidence in the Conference on Disarmament as an effective multilateral disarmament body. In this respect, I wish to express the appreciation of my delegation to you, Mr. President, and to the Ambassador of Japan for having conducted consultations in search of a consensus on the mandate to establish a committee on agenda item 1.

Let me now turn to the chemical weapons issue, which has become the main preoccupation of the Conference to date. In his statement of 15 February 1990, Ambassador Ledogar of the United States, inter alia, introduced the United States-USSR joint statement and echoed the reaffirmation of President Bush's strong commitment to progress on the multilateral negotiations in order to conclude a chemical weapons convention soon. It is within this context that I would like to note with satisfaction the content of the joint statement and support the strong commitment made by the two super-Powers to multilateral negotiations to ban chemical weapons. Without their commitment, the Conference on Disarmament is unlikely to achieve progress on this particular item of our agenda.

I do not hesitate, therefore, to make use of this opportunity to appeal to all parties, and especially the super-Powers, to fully commit themselves to speed up the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on matters in which they have a particular interest, as well as on questions which concern almost all States participating in the negotiations. As they commit themselves to do so in the prohibition of chemical weapons, it is only just and fair to request them also to embark upon multilateral negotiations on those issues I mentioned earlier.

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

The negotiations to totally ban chemical weapons during the 1989 session of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as the open-ended consultation recently concluded, have made considerable progress. Understanding in some aspects has been achieved, and divergences of views have been narrowed. We notice among other things that efforts to set up a verification régime under the convention to totally ban chemical weapons, as well as other matters pertinent to the smooth running of the convention, have persistently been expended by the Committee.

We are gratified to have been working with the scale of negotiations in the Committee and the wealth of ideas that delegations have submitted. The outgoing chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Morel, as well as the chairmen of the five working groups, deserve our appreciation and gratitude for the able and creative manner in which they guided the negotiations last year. At the same time, however, if we reflect on the commitment entered into by the international community to comprehensively ban chemical weapons, then we are astonished to learn that one of the most crucial elements of the future convention, the prohibition of use of chemical weapons, is excluded from the Committee's mandate.

United Nations General Assembly resolution 44/115 B specifically urges the Conference to pursue as a matter of continuing urgency its negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. The message is clear. The General Assembly has specifically stressed that the convention should include the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons.

The demand of the international community to ban chemical weapons results from the fear of the most dangerous consequences if such weapons were to be used. The great danger that chemical weapons pose to mankind is not the development, production or stockpiling of those weapons as such, but their possible use. Such a possibility will always exist as long as the development, production and stockpiling of these weapons are not totally eliminated. The prohibition and prevention of the use of chemical weapons therefore constitutes the core of the problem concerning the banning of chemical weapons, and should therefore be covered by the scope of the future chemical weapons convention.

Objections to the proposals to include use have been raised for a number of reasons. One of these suggests that the use of chemical weapons has been prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and that there is no need to include such a prohibition in the future convention: another is that a new convention containing the same rules would weaken the instrument already in existence.

As we all know, the 1925 Geneva Protocol has a number of weaknesses. It conditionally bans the use of chemical weapons, and more than 40 States parties, among them all the great Powers, made reservations stating that they would not be bound by the convention vis-à-vis any State whose armed forces failed to abide by the Protocol. It also contains no mechanism to verify compliance, and it has been evident that it cannot totally prevent the use of these weapons. The effectiveness of the Protocol is therefore questionable, since it could be regarded as a "no first use" agreement.

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

I now wish to refer to the question of the non-production of chemical weapons, a particular aspect of the convention which has been dealt with by international gatherings even during the preparation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Lengthy and painstaking negotiations on this question at that time finally resulted in the agreement which prohibits only the use of these weapons.

After the signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, subsequent activities unsuccessfully attempted to establish a régime for the regulation of the non-production of chemical weapons. Documentation on the elaboration of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the negotiations to establish the future convention illustrate that it has always been possible to divert chemicals intended for peaceful purposes to weapon purposes.

Those exercises, as well as ours today, have shown the complexity of establishing a régime which could prevent any possible clandestine production of chemical weapons. Hence, if we wish to have a proper convention, the most viable way to prevent loopholes is the enforcement of a challenge inspection régime which could clear any doubts and which would disclose any act of non-compliance.

We notice that the essential elements necessary to arrive at concrete treaty language concerning the question of challenge inspection have been identified and discussed. They are now ready to be further negotiated in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Challenge inspection, in my view, constitutes an ultimate source of confidence in the convention. It should be borne in mind, however, that recourse to it should be regarded as exceptional, and confidence in the convention should be built up, as far as possible, by other means which do not involve resort to an open expression of suspicion. An idea about verification measures based on an elaborate system of quotas has been tabled. This in my view, merits further consideration by the Ad hoc Committee, because the measure would grant the parties to the future convention the possibility of displaying their openness and their spirit of co-operation, thus reducing the need to conduct challenge inspections.

Some may recall that the question of strengthening the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States which have undertaken to renounce nuclear weapons was one of the central issues in the course of negotiations on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The resolution adopted by the forty-fourth United Nations General Assembly session stressed the urgent need for an international instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

As a non-nuclear-weapon State, my country believes that the most effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Pending nuclear disarmament, all nuclear-weapon States should give an unconditional guarantee not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States are, therefore, the least nuclear-weapon States could render in exchange for the commitment of non-nuclear-weapon States not to produce, acquire or possess nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

During the 1988 and 1989 sessions of the Conference we noted that the Ad hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances examined and discussed proposals for a common formula of assurances to be included in an international legally binding instrument, and proposals for interim arrangements. Options such as the establishment of a single common formula, the establishment of a common formula for each category of non-nuclear-weapon State and other possible alternatives have been discussed. Without prejudging the result, discussion could perhaps be resumed in the Ad hoc Committee to further elaborate the proposals. My delegation wishes to reiterate its readiness to continue the search for a common formula of assurances, particularly an international instrument of a legally binding nature.

Touching upon the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which is dealt with under agenda item 8, I wish firstly to state that my country's long-held position on this matter stands. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in our view constitutes a positive step in contributing to regional peace, security and stability by reducing the geographical areas within which nuclear weapons can operate. It can also make a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament, including the strengthening of the non-proliferation endeavour. A nuclear-weapon-free zone is a nuclear disarmament measure by means of which non-nuclear-weapon States can make a practical demonstration of their commitment to and pursuit of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Given the increasing climate of confidence in the present international situation, my delegation believes that the establishment of such zones in many parts of the world, including South-East Asia, should be encouraged.

We are now facing a challenging world where unprecedented changes in the international arena are taking place. Today, we can see the spirit of reconciliation and co-operation clearly emerging between the two military alliances, each of which, in the past, saw the other as a threat to its very existence. It is our task, therefore, to achieve lasting peace through disarmament and to continue to encourage the shift from confrontation to conciliation and co-operation.

In this respect, it is encouraging to note the requests emanating from many countries to participate as observers in the Conference. It is the expectation of my delegation that their participation will positively contribute to the discussions on resolving pending matters and steer the Conference in adapting to the changes under way outside this forum. Moreoever, we would also hope that their involvement in the negotiations would lead them to abide by any legally binding international instrument produced. Hopefully this would also pave the way to universal adherence to the instrument.

We have made efforts in the past to enhance the effective functioning of the Conference, inter alia, by re-establishing the informal Group of Seven. My delegation would support the re-establishment of the Group, which should be given the task of evaluating and making suggestions on what the Conference should do in response to the new developments. We should not be too slow, otherwise the credibility of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament forum will be called into question and its very existence jeopardized.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? It seems not.

I shall now proceed to suspend this plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting of the Conference to consider requests from non-members for participation in our work.

The meeting was suspended at 12 noon and resumed at 12.10 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 538th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

As a result of the informal meeting that we have held today, I propose that we take a decision, as indicated in the note by the President which the secretariat has circulated today as document CD/WP.381, concerning three additional requests from non-member States to participate in the work of the Conference. Since no objections were raised at the informal meeting, I suggest that we now adopt this decision.

It was do decided.

The PRESIDENT: In connection with the decision just taken, I wish to declare for the record that the statement I made at the 534th plenary meeting of the Conference also applies to the requests that we have considered today.

I should like to announce that the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons will hold its first meeting of the present annual session on Thursday, 1 March at 3 p.m. in this Council chamber.

In the final part of the last plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament that I have the honour and pleasure to preside, I would like to share with you some observations as your outgoing President.

The Netherlands Government very much welcomed the opportunity afforded by the February 1990 presidency to be instrumental in getting things done, having our work organized without delay in an appropriate way. The Netherlands attaches great value to our unique multilateral negotiating forum. The renewed presence of the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs at the opening day of our spring session bears witness to this strong commitment to the CD. In his statement Minister van den Broek outlined in clear terms the Netherlands views on the basic issues of disarmament today and how the Conference on Disarmament should respond to the challenges posed by the radical changes occurring in our world.

In order to express both the motives and the sentiments which have led me in discharging the responsibilities of the presidency, I think I can do no better than refer to that statement made by my Minister on 6 February 1990. You will bear with me if I quote a passage from that address which brings out our approach in no uncertain terms. Having referred to the events of the revolutionary year 1989, in which pluralist democracy and human freedom gained substantial ground, my Minister stated:

(The President)

"... the order of peace we are building involves a transition from a security relationship based on antagonism to one based on co-operation and trust. Its foundations are: respect for democratic values and human rights, peaceful resolution of conflicts and security based on mutual assurance rather than superior strength and threats."

These sentiments have very much inspired the Netherlands delegation throughout its tenure of the presidency.

Reviewing now the practical business the Netherlands presidency had to transact, I observe the following. As usual at the opening of the annual session, the Conference had to deal with a number of organizational questions, which are required to provide appropriate frameworks for our consideration of substantive questions. Bringing about an effective, verifiable, truly global convention bann g chemical weapons at the earliest date is a political priority. The sustained progress achieved in the negotiations in this multilateral body as well as in the bilateral rounds between the United States and the Soviet Union constitute a momentum in itself whose impact on our work on chemical weapons in the Conference on Disarmament cannot fail to be noticed.

In the Netherlands view it was vital to get the CW negotiations in 1990 started with a proper mandate as soon as possible. Establilshing an appropriate mandate was a complex issue in itself. I felt very encouraged, however, by the positive and flexible attitude taken by all delegations. I therefore welcome the substantial improvement achieved this year in the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. This is a major step forward after several years of work under the previous, more limited mandate. The participation of an unparalleled number of non-member States in our work on a CW ban holds great promise for the universality of this CW convention, indeed a foremost requirement. Combining all these factors, I submit that our chances for success in relation to the conclusion of the long-desired CW convention are better than ever. Indeed, the time has come to reap the fruits of our efforts.

In assessing the organization of work of the Conference during the month of February, I would like to note that early agreement was reached on the establishment of the Ad hoc Committees on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and on Radiological Weapons. Their recently appointed Chairmen, Ambassadors Negrotto Cambiaso and Varga respectively, are now consulting on preparations for the sessions of those subsidiary bodies.

We have also held consultations in connection with the first part of agenda item 7, entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons". Those consultations indicated that it would be advisable to keep this matter under review and to deal with it whenever necessary, possibly at informal meetings of the Conference.

I would like to stress the importance of the decisions taken on requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference. During the month of February, we took action on an unprecedented number of

(The President)

requests, 33 in all, a decision which, in my view, is a good augury for the development of our work. This is particularly the case in our negotiations on chemical weapons, in which all 33 States have been invited to participate. We are all aware of the outstanding contributions made by non-members in previous years and, as our negotiations on that subject intensify, I am sure that we shall continue to benefit from such participation.

The involvement of non-members in our activities represents a signficant step towards securing a universal process of participation in the elaboration and acceptance of any agreement concluded in the Conference. I hope that non-members will make full use of the opportunities afforded them for participation in our work. Except for decision-making, non-member States have been entitled to the same facilities as granted to the members of the Conference, including the right to make statements in plenary meetings and to submit written proposals or working documents on measures of disarmament that are the subject of negotiations in the Conference, participation in subsidiary bodies established by the Conference under items on the agenda, as well as in informal meetings devoted to such questions.

As the practice of the Conference has developed, non-members have also participated in informal consultations held in subsidiary bodies, and furthermore they have assumed responsibility for the chairmanship or co-ordination of certain groups. I am sure that on this basis, non-members are able to contribute as much as members to the success of our work and I would like, at this stage, as I have done in a number of cases privately, to encourage non-members to participate in all aspects relating to the agenda items that they have chosen, by obtaining assistance from experts in those technical matters facing us, whenever necessary.

As I have had occasion to point out before, the Conference is a specialist body, engaged in the negotiation of agreements of universal scope. The fact that by now there are, in all, 73 members and non-members taking part in the work of the Conference augurs well for our efforts to achieve universally acceptable agreements. In making this comment, I have in mind of course, first of all, the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. As I said, our chances for success in the conclusion of a CW convention are better than ever. I said so with reference to external factors. But there is also an internal element of encouragement: the fact that the stewardship over the ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is in the safe and trusted hands of Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden and that the three working groups are being coached by such competent leaders as Mr. Lamazière of Brazil, Mr. Meerburg of the Netherlands and Mr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic. I would like to express once more our full confidence in this most dynamic team to which we have entrusted the leadership over the CW negotiations.

I felt it my duty, immediately after the opening of the annual session, to renew, the presidential consultations on the question of a mandate for an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1, entitled "Nuclear test ban". These consultations are still going on. I take it that all delegations are aware of the high political relevance of these probings, especially this year. As I announced at the beginning of the session of the Conference this year,

(The President)

Ambassador Donowaki willingly agreed to continue the efforts of his predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, who, in the wake of his presidency of March 1989, initiated a dialogue in search of a consensus on the mandate for an ad hoc committee under agenda item 1. Since then, we have heard a number of plenary statements expressing strong support for the worthy efforts being made by the leader of the Japanese delegation. According to Ambassador Donowaki, the dialogue conducted by his predecessor and himself on an informal and individual basis proved to be encouraging. It has been found that a great number of delegations indeed wish to start substantive work on nuclear testing issues in the Conference. Also, on an individual and informal basis, Ambassador Donowaki confirmed the conviction of his predecessor that the draft mandate contained in document CD/863 could be used as a starting-point to formulate a consensus. It is my wish that delegations would show readiness to pursue all avenues in order to disentangle ourselves from an impasse and arrive at a solution. We know that we are close to a consensus on the text of the mandate so that the Ad hoc committee can start its work as early as possible.

The calender has it that February is a short month for transacting business in the Conference. Consultations are under way on the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee under agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". The Conference will also keep under review the appropriate organizational framework to deal with agenda items 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". Consultations will further continue on two matters which are not part of our annual agenda but which have been under consideration for a number of years, that is, expansion of the membership of the Conference and its improved and effective functioning. While these are not easy subjects, I am convinced that the diplomatic skill and experience of Ambassador Azikiwe will be assets in our further discussion of them. I wish him a successful outcome to his endeavours.

Nobody can or will deny that no effort should be spared in striving for the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. This is not only a technical subject, although we should continue to rationalize the work of the Conference. We also face a highly political matter, as both the agenda and the organizational arrangements must respond to international developments outside the Conference on Disarmament. Organizational arrangements do not have an intrinsic value. They should keep pace with political conditions. The way of dealing with the various items on the agenda - either through negotiations or through pre-negotiations - should reflect the degree of political maturity of the subject-matter concerned. This does not, of course, preclude our consideration of all other items on the agenda or the inclusion of new items as a result of international developments.

Another element for consideration is the question of how far our present working structure of geopolitical groups is still relevant in view of the rapid changes that we are witnessing on the international political scene.

(The President)

I sum up: I submit that the work of the CD should be governed by a thorough sense of realism. Therefore, the CD should take into account the exciting events which are occurring almost daily and which cannot leave our work in the CD unaffected. Indeed, the chances for a convergence of views and the conclusion of agreements concerning multilateral disarmament are greater than ever.

I have no other business for today. I shall now adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 1 March, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.



CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.539
1 March 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 1 March 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Emeka Ayo Azikiwe (Nigeria)

GE.90-60269/2875a

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 539th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Allow me, at the beginning, to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference, to His Excellency the Minister of External Affairs of Nigeria, Dr. Rilwanu Lukman, who is attending the commencement of the Nigerian presidency of the Conference to stress the importance that our country attaches to the work of this multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, to which Nigeria has belonged since its inception in 1962. Dr. Lukman is a graduate of Imperial College in the University of London and the University of Leoben, Austria, where he studied mining engineering and mining mineral resources. Dr. Lukman is a Fellow and past President of the Nigerian Mining and Geosciences Society, a Fellow of Imperial College, a Fellow of the Institute of Mining and Metallurgy and also a Knight of the British Empire. He has long been associated with the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Before assuming his present portfolio Dr. Lukman was Minister of Mines, Power and Steel and also of Petroleum Resources, in which capacity he was President of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) from June 1986 to December 1989. His Excellency the Minister of External Affairs will address the Conference today, and I should like to express my gratitude to him for having decided to attend this opening and to convey to the Conference the views of the Nigerian Government on the important subjects facing the Conference at this annual session.

Allow me to thank Ambassador Hendrik Wagenmakers of the Netherlands for the very effective and able manner in which he discharged his responsibilities during the month of February. He showed once more his diplomatic skill and experience in the field of disarmament and advanced substantially the organization of our work for the annual session. In that connection, I pledge to all of you the commitment of the Nigerian delegation to actively continue to deal with all those matters which are still subject to consultation. I intend to engage in renewed efforts with the objective of re-establishing the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space at the earliest possible date, and to conduct consultations on agenda items 2 and 3 in the next few days. I have taken note of the statement of my predecessor concerning the consultations being conducted by Ambassador Donowaki of Japan on agenda item 1, and I welcome his untiring efforts in this respect, particularly keeping in mind the outstanding manner in which he represented Japan in my country, Nigeria, before joining us here in the Conference on Disarmament. I should like, for my part, to encourage him to continue with his valuable contribution to our work. As you know, my country attaches great importance to the question of a nuclear test ban, and I shall spare no effort to promote agreement on that subject, including of course making myself available to assist Ambassador Donowaki and other colleagues dealing with this subject whenever necessary. Among the questions still pending, we should also discuss the expansion of the membership of the Conference and its improved and effective functioning. I also assure you that I shall be at the disposal of all members in the consideration of these issues and other matters before the Conference. By the same token, I am sure that I will greatly benefit from your advice and experience in our common tasks.

(The President)

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", and agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". In accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I should like now to give the floor to His Excellency the Minister of External Affairs of Nigeria, Dr. Rilwanu Lukman.

Mr. LUKMAN (Nigeria): Mr. President, Mr. Permanent Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Your Excellencies, I am honoured to address you today at a time when the prospects of peace and security have taken a positive turn in international relations. I am particularly pleased to see our distinguished Permanent Representative taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March. This is a fitting tribute to Nigeria's role in the field of disarmament. Let me also congratulate Mr. Hendrik Wagenmakers, Ambassador of the Netherlands, for the effective manner in which he successfully conducted the work of the Conference in the month of February.

As a country traditionally dedicated to the cause of international peace and security, Nigeria's position on disarmament issues has always been clear and unambiguous. We have a long tradition of participating in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. We shall continue to work actively in this and other forums to initiate and support proposals for the promotion and strengthening of international peace and security.

At the United Nations, the Nigerian delegation has been actively participating over the years in the negotiations to review and strengthen the provisions of the United Nations Charter, in particular its peace and security provisions. Similarly, here in the Conference on Disarmament, we remain committed to the work of the Conference and continue to give careful attention and support to all proposals enhancing peace and security.

There have been dramatic developments in the past three years, resulting from the new spirit of co-operation between the two super-Powers. This evolution has facilitated the reduction in global tension, the resolution of some regional conflicts and the creation of a conducive climate for negotiations leading to the resolution of others which hitherto appeared intractable. While Nigeria is pleased with this increasing manifestation of co-operation and the attendant relaxation in tension among nation States, we must guard against slipping back into the climate of mistrust and insecurity that characterized the last decade.

With renewed hopes resulting from the recent developments in international politics, my delegation would like to call on all States to reaffirm their faith and restore confidence in the various multilateral institutions such as this Conference for the maintenance of international peace and security. The significant lesson to be derived from the recent changes is that rapid progress in inter-State relations takes place in a climate of trust, confidence, good will and transparency. We therefore call on all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the super-Powers, to reconsider the doctrine of nuclear deterrence with a view to attaining security at lower levels of armament.

(Mr. Lukman, Nigeria)

In response to serious concerns expressed by the international community, the Soviet Union and the United States of America in December 1987 signed the first nuclear disarmament agreement in history - the INF Treaty. Its value no doubt lies in the promise of providing the basis for a far-reaching agreement on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. Last 22 January, the Soviet Union and the United States moved a step further in signing a verification measure for the first-ever reciprocal trial inspection of their nuclear warheads, and the renewal of the strategic arms reduction talks. Also gratifying are the efforts being made to reduce conventional forces in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Notwithstanding these commendable efforts, as well as other relevant unilateral and bilateral arms reductions already undertaken or in progress, there is no substitute for a multilateral negotiating body like the Conference on Disarmament. Global issues require active and continuous participation by all States. The potential effects of these efforts will depend largely on the political willingness of the nuclear-weapon States to negotiate in good faith, abide by already established security standards and retain an unswerving commitment to the survival of mankind.

There is ample evidence that sophisticated technologies are being employed for the development of a new generation of nuclear and conventional weapons. We are now witnessing the qualitative refinement of nuclear weapons to compensate for the quantitative reductions in many instances. A nuclear test ban continues to be the most important item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. The Secretary-General of the United Nations rightly observed in his message to the current session that "the United Nations has repeatedly assigned the highest priority to the issue of cessation of all nuclear test explosions. The encouraging signs witnessed in bilateral negotiations should be further advanced. However, I remain convinced that a complete ban on such tests can pave the way to nuclear disarmament and rid the world of the nuclear menace".

If a problem can be solved by the amount of attention it has received, then the complete prohibition of all nuclear testing ought to have been achieved long ago. The partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 underlined the importance of bringing nuclear testing to an end. Both the PTBT and the NPT, to which Nigeria is a party, imposed concrete obligations on depositary Governments, to "seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end".

Nigeria is convinced that if the objectives of nuclear disarmament are to be attained, the utmost priority must be accorded to a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. This important disarmament measure is a challenge to all States in achieving the eventual elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. Logically, adherence to the treaty has to be universal, as a CTBT will reinforce mutual trust and confidence-building measures not only between the super-Powers and their allies, but also in all regions. The commitment of nuclear-weapon States in negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty is no doubt essential. It bears repetition that the role of the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating such a treaty should never be in doubt. No obstacle should be put in its way in negotiating an instrument of such vital importance towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Lukman, Nigeria)

We note with satisfaction that the process of convening an amendment conference to convert the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty has already received the support of many States parties. Nigeria supports this bold initiative already endorsed at Belgrade last August 1989 at the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement.

In a few months from now, in August to be precise, the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will commence here in Geneva. The Treaty, which was negotiated in the ENDC in the mid-1960s, occupies pride of place as the disarmament agreement with the widest adherence. It has contributed immensely to preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons and to international efforts aimed at averting the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty remains today a disarmament instrument of immense value. It is with a sense of satisfaction, therefore, that I recall that Nigeria not only participated effectively in the negotiation of the Treaty, but, more importantly, was the first among the countries that negotiated the Treaty to ratify it. This clearly demonstrates the abiding faith which Nigeria has in the Treaty in particular and the non-proliferation régime in general.

In an effort to further strengthen the non-proliferation régime and attract greater adherence to the NPT, the Government of Nigeria on 2 November 1989 formally submitted to the depositary Governments of the Treaty a proposed agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT for consideration during the forthcoming review conference next August. The text of the proposal has already been circulated in this Conference as an official document. I am also informed that the depositary Governments have similarly circulated it among States parties. The proposal, which is complementary in nature to the NPT, does not in any way represent an amendment to the Treaty. Nigeria believes that the NPT is a very valuable document which does not require any amendment. What is required is the adoption of such necessary additional measures outside the Treaty, but closely related to it, as would strengthen the confidence of the parties, particularly the non-nuclear-weapon States. Such measures would also strengthen the non-proliferation régime.

Our proposal seeks to allay the anxiety of most non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT whose confidence in the Treaty appears to be eroding, owing to their concern that forgoing the nuclear option through their membership of the NPT may have placed them at a permanent military disadvantage and made them vulnerable to nuclear intimidation. For such States parties, the adoption of the proposed agreement would restore their confidence in the Treaty, by making it more relevant to their security concerns in this nuclear era. The proposal also seeks to provide a further incentive to non-parties which have hitherto remained outside the Treaty to consider adhering to the NPT.

Nigeria hopes that all parties to the NPT represented in this unique multilateral disarmament negotiating body will lend their valuable support to this initiative when it comes up for consideration both at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, and at the review conference itself.

(Mr. Lukman, Nigeria)

I would like to make it clear that Nigeria's proposed agreement is without prejudice to the work of the Conference on Disarmament on negative security assurances. Nigeria has submitted proposals to this Conference on the item, and will continue to contribute towards the efforts of the Conference until such time as an appropriate formula is found for the provision of assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States, irrespective of whether or not such States have relinquished the nuclear option through a legally binding international instrument.

Let me now address myself to the work you have done so far in negotiating a convention on the complete elimination of chemical weapons. We are pleased to note the tremendous effort made towards the attainment of this objective. Deep inroads have been made in areas that had been contentious and intractable. The issue of verification, and especially the politically charged question of challenge inspection, have seen substantial progress. Political, legal and institutional matters are also being addressed. This is the edifice on which the future convention will rest and must therefore be given the same consideration and attention as other issues. Of great importance to my Government is the question of universality. Universal adherence to the convention is essential for the complete eradication of chemical weapons. In this regard, the provision of incentives such as assistance and co-operation in economic and technological development is important.

Also of particular importance for the convention is the need to assure States that giving up the right to produce or acquire weapons would not leave a State party at the mercy of non-parties. For this reason nothing could be more reassuring to the States parties, especially the weaker ones, than provision in the future convention for collective and mandatory action in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter against any chemical weapon attack, be it from a State party or a non-party to the convention. This is the most important single inducement that can help to ensure the adherence of the weaker States to the future convention. The international community is anxiously awaiting the conclusion of the convention. There is therefore a need to keep up the momentum that the negotiations have acquired during the past year, so that the convention can be concluded at the earliest date. In this connection, I would like to state that Nigeria has no chemial weapons and does not intend to acquire them in the future.

We have also been following with keen interest the negotiations on a convention to prohibit the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. We welcome the initiative and indeed the foresight to ban such dangerous weapons even before production. Nigeria has broadened the scope of the convention by proposing the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes for hostile purposes. But I must note with some sense of regret that despite the time that has been devoted to this item, the Conference is still a long way from concluding a convention. A faster pace of work is needed. This Conference owes it to the international community to prevent the future development of radiological weapons and such methods of warfare.

(Mr. Lukman, Nigeria)

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that ridding our planet of the vast arsenals of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is the greatest challenge of our time. This must be reflected in the work of the Conference. Apart from the tremendous impact that this will have on the security of States, the resources freed as a result of disarmament measures will enable the international community to fully address those other areas that also pose serious threats to international peace and security. The realization that a nuclear war cannot be won, the appreciation that more armament does not necessarily mean greater security and the emerging willingness to seek security at lower levels of armaments are a reflection of the changing times. We must take advantage of the window of opportunity brought about by this new spirit of co-operation.

The PRESIDENT: I should like to thank His Excellency the Minister of External Affairs of Nigeria for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I have no other speaker on my list today. Does any other member wish to take the floor?

The plenary meeting stands adjourned. */

The plenary meeting rose at 10.45 a.m.

---

*/ It was understood that the next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament would be held on Tuesday, 6 March, at 10 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.540
6 March 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FORTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 6 March 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Emeka Ayo Azikiwe (Nigeria)

GE.90-60295/1634B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 540th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with the programme of work, the Conference will start today its consideration of agenda item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, in conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Mexico and Bulgaria. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marin Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The delegation of Mexico would like to make a few comments on item 5 on our agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", and share with the other delegations some of our general considerations on the work and the future of the Conference. But before I turn to that, Mr. President, may I express our great pleasure at seeing you presiding over our work and pledge to you the fullest co-operation of our delegation? Through the presence of its Minister for Foreign Affairs last week, Nigeria underlined the importance it has always attached to this forum for negotiating disarmament agreements. I should also like to thank Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands for his efforts and the efforts of his delegation during the month of February.

For centuries the conquest of space was but a dream cropping up sporadically in theoretical debates among scientists or in the tales of writers. In the last few decades that dream has turned into reality and today is an enterprise, a vast enterprise which, encouraged by man's pioneering and adventurous spirit, offers us many opportunities for international co-operation. However, we should recognize that 30 years after the beginning of the space era, and despite our best intentions, the United Nations has not yet succeeded in forging a definite and defining role for itself in this sphere. In contrast to the chapters relating to decolonization and international economic co-operation contemplated in the Charter of the Organization itself, the United Nations has had to improvise in the area of outer space, as indeed it has had to fill the gap in the Charter with regard to nuclear weapons. And it is to this very task of improvization that the General Assembly has had to grapple with many a difficulty, including sometimes opposing interpretations and intentions.

When and why did these difficulties arise? The question has no easy answer. Are we dealing with a manufacturing defect, an original flaw, or is it just a stumbling-block - a mere accident? Let us look at how the matter stood in 1957. In the autumn of that year both super-Powers were in a position to launch a test satellite. On 4 October the Soviet Union was the first to do so. That event surprised many and served as a stimulus to others. The result was the inclusion of an item entitled "Question of the peaceful use of outer space" in the agenda of the thirteenth session of the General Assembly, held in 1958. On completing its consideration of that item, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1348 (XIII), thus establishing an ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) made up of 18 nations and entrusted with reporting on the activities and resources of the

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

United Nations, of its specialized agencies and of other international organizations relating to this matter, the organizational arrangements to facilitate international co-operation in this field within the framework of the United Nations and the nature of legal problems which might arise in the carrying out of programmes to explore of outer space. The resolution was adopted by 53 votes to 9, with 19 abstentions. The opposition came from the countries of Eastern Europe, for two reasons: first, the Committee's mandate passed over in silence the question of the militarization of outer space, and secondly, the Committee's composition was unbalanced as it only included three countries from the Socialist group.

The foregoing was set out in detail on 13 December 1958 by Ambassador A.A. Sobolev of the Soviet Union, who added that his Government would not participate in the work of the Committee because its unbalanced composition had been imposed by a resolution adopted by an "automatic majority". In turn the United States Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, said:

> "I heard Mr. Sobolev this evening talk about automatic majorities. One of the things that has impressed me here - and, I think, has impressed quite a number of delegations - is the automatic minority which we see performing fairly regularly. I think that if the day ever comes when the Soviet Union gets a majority in this body - and I hope it will come, because it will mean that the Soviet Union has changed its policy and its attitude - he will not call it an automatic majority. It is automatic when the other fellow gets it."

The following year, when agreement had been reached on a membership which was more acceptable to the countries of the Socialist group, resolution 1472 (XIV) was adopted without a vote. This resolution established COPUOS. On that occasion the General Assembly also decided to convene a first international scientific conference for the exchange of experience in the peaceful uses of outer space. These then are the two pillars on which the work of the United Nations in this field is based: the international conferences, of which UNISPACE 82 was the last, and the annual meetings of COPUOS and its two sub-committees. Though it can be said that in 1959, in establishing COPUOS, the General Assembly was able to overcome the problems deriving from the cold war, the history of recent decades shows us that the exploration and use of outer space, far from turning into a sphere of international co-operation for peaceful purposes, has become yet another arena for confrontation and competition between the two main military Powers.

Military activities in outer space have been the source of growing concern on the part of the international community. Back in 1957, Canada, the United States, France and the United Kingdom presented a proposal for the creation of a technical committee to study the features of an inspection system designed to assure that the launching of objects through outer space would be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes. The Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, held in Vienna in August 1982, formulated a set of recommendations designed to further international co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes. As a result of that Conference the General Assembly adopted resolution 37/90, in which, "gravely concerned the

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

extension of an arms race into outer space", it invited "all Member States, in particular those with major space capabilities to contribute actively to the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space, as an essential condition for the promotion of international co-operation in the exploration and uses of outer space for peaceful purposes".

The day before, on 9 December 1982, in its resolution 37/83, the General Assembly had requested this Conference - which was still called a Committee - "to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space" and "to establish an ad hoc working group on the subject at the beginning of its session in 1983, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspect in outer space".

The following year, in its resolution 38/80, the General Assembly called upon "all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to undertake prompt negotiations, under the aupices of the United Nations, with a view to reaching agreement or agreements designed to halt the militarization of outer space and prevent an arms race in outer space, thus contributing to the achievement of the internationally accepted goal of ensuring the utilization of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes". In that same resolution it requested COPUOS "to consider, as a matter of priority, the questions relating to the militarization of outer space, taking into account that, in General Assembly resolution 37/83 of 9 December 1982, the Committee on Disarmament was requested to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space, and also taking into account the need to co-ordinate the efforts of COPUOS and the Committee on Disarmament".

Since then, year in, year out, the Assembly has reiterated that this Conference, "as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate on the prevention of an arms race in outer space".

In August 1985 the Group of Six once again urged the United States and the Soviet Union to put an end to the militarization of outer space. At that time - about six or seven years ago - we were being told that COPUOS was not the appropriate forum to consider measures designed to prevent the growing militarization of outer space. The appropriate forum to negotiate agreements, we were told, was this Conference. Already at that time, it was estimated that three of every four of the thousands of satellites launched into outer space had a military use - to improve the effectiveness of armies and their weapons systems, for navigation, communications, meteorology and geodesy, right up in what is called reconnaissance, in other words, the gathering of data on possible military targets. Meanwhile, anti-satellite weapons had already been tested, and thought began to be given to the possibility of establishing an anti-ballistic-missile system in space.

Since then, and as a result of the Strategic Defense Initiative, commonly known as "Star Wars", there has been an increase in the number of contracts for research projects, on which it is calculated that astronomical sums have already been spent. Hence it is natural that hundreds of companies, laboratories and private institutes have evinced growing interest in participating in one way or another in the various projects deriving from

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

"Star Wars". It is obvious that a vast network of vested interests is taking shape which, as part of the United States military-industrial complex, will perform the task of promoting the programme for their own benefit. There is no doubt that something similar is happening in the Soviet Union.

Despite the repeated appeals of the international community, this Conference has not been able to tackle this priority matter successfully. True, year in, year out we repeat the ritual of establishing an ad hoc committee to consider the item, but because of the opposition of one delegation, this mandate is not a negotiating mandate. The ritual is being repeated at the moment.

This brings us to the second point of this statement. After 12 years of absence we have come back to this forum. We left in 1978, shortly after the General Assembly introduced certain adjustments into its methods of work and approved its enlargement. At that time we worked under the auspices of the unusual institution of a co-chairmanship. There were 26 members, although one of the seats was always empty. In the 1970s we had to justify our existence, and the ENMOD Convention was drawn up. The international community did not pay much attention to it. Then came the 1978 adjustments and the enlargement, and today we are the multilateral negotiating forum by antonomasia.

The past of our Conference contains some important chapters and many missed opportunities. Its present appears rather promising owing to the subject of chemical weapons, but its medium-term future is frankly uncertain. A couple of decades ago, Mrs. Alva Myrdal periodically invited us to think collectively about the course of our work. She described that exercise as a "mapping expedition". We might also think of the terms used by architects before they begun the construction of a building. They talk of a "critical path". Call it what you will, we must devote some thought to this matter. Unlike architects, we would be following our critical path after the building - that is, the Conference - had already been constructed. But on the other hand, there is much accumulated experience and, as we have observed, much good will among the delegates present here, who, if I may say so, form a sort of guild of craftsmen in the field of disarmament. So we must try and see the horizon more clearly. And we must begin by working for the credibility of this Conference. Where do we see here a reflection of the sense of urgency which usually appears in the resolutions of the General Assembly and informs the work and opinions of many non-governmental organizations? A second question is: what is going to happen in this room once the convention on chemical weapons has been concluded? Are we going to plunge again into the sterile pantomime of past eras? Will we then seek some item of little value to the international community simply in order to "produce something" and thereby make a good impression on the General Assembly? In a word, is there life after the CW convention?

Moreover, if we remain today attached to the system of antagonistic military alliances or, even more dangerously, if we try to consolidate and institutionalize military advantages obtained unilaterally, we will achieve little in this Conference. Here we continue to base our actions on obsolete politico-military models. One of the military alliances is undergoing profound changes. The countries of Eastern Europe have announced that they

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

that they will make unilateral cuts in their military budgets, their armies and their weapons, as well as their intention to reach agreement on the withdrawal of foreign troops from their territories. Such unilateral or negotiated steps constitute concrete and effective disarmament measures. The other alliance - whose raison d'être is disappearing - will doubtless have to take similar steps. What will be the purpose of maintaining an established military alliance to confront an alleged threat which has vanished? Hence, we must give thought to the new geopolitical reality which is in gestation. It is obvious that the speed of the changes in Europe has surprised even the most experienced political observers. The political and military adjustments deriving from these changes have already begun to appear, and they are occurring with unusual naturalness. Governments are acting in accordance with the will of their own peoples, without consulting anyone and without asking permission to do so. And what are we to say of the non-aligned or neutral countries? Non-aligned and neutral vis-à-vis whom?

This Conference was created and continues to work under a system deriving from the military treaties of the post-war era. This system will soon be history. When the then Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament began its work, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union stated on 15 March 1962:

> "The Eighteen-Nation Committee can be said to be a sort of cross-section of the present-day world. All three main groups of States are represented here: the socialist countries, the States belonging to the military blocs of the Western Powers, and the neutralist countries. The Committee also incorporates the interests of the various ... regions of the world.
>
> "Never before has there been a negotiating body for disarmament that was so fitted for the solution of the problem confronting it. The Committee is broad enough to be representative in the full sense of the word. At the same time it is narrow enough to act efficiently without getting stuck in the quagmire of endless discussions in which the vital cause of disarmament would be bogged down" (ENDC/PV.2).

On the same day the Secretary of State of the United States said:

> "All of us will agree, I am sure, that this Conference faces one of the most perplexing and urgent tasks on the agenda of man. In this endeavour we welcome our association with representatives from countries which have not previously been intimately involved with earlier negotiations on disarmament. The dreary history of such negotiations shows that we need their help and fresh points of view. The presence of these delegations reminds us too that arms races are not the exclusive concern of the great Powers. Countries situated in every region of the world are confronted with their own conflicts and their tensions, and some are engaged in competition. We are not here dealing solely with a single struggle in which a few large States are engaged, with the rest of the world as spectators. Every State has a contribution to make in establishing the conditions for general disarmament in its own way" (ENDC/PV.2).

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

Although in 1978 it was agreed to abandon the institution of the co-chairmanship, we continue to be organized on the basis of the initial asymmetry: an identical number of participants from both groupings or military blocs, and as many from the non-aligned or neutral countries. But I repeat that this system is on its way out, and consequently we must design a new one. Hence the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference is difficult to consider now in accordance with what was agreed here - in other words, as paragraphs 14 and 15 of the 1989 report (CD/956) put it, "so as to maintain balance in the membership of the Conference". Which balance? That of 1962 or another balance based on very different criteria?

We are witnesses to major geopolitical changes. We have seen the beginning of a process, the end of which we do not know. Its new politico-military order has not yet been forged. Its licence is being negotiated. Consequently a degree of caution is to be recommended when we examine the expansion of the membership of the Conference.

If we have spoken somewhat at length on this occasion, it is to stress the importance we attach to these questions. Our ideas, which we hope will be considered useful, have been formulated in a constructive spirit and with the respectful scepticism which our deliberations merit.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Kostov.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to warmly congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference for the month of March, and to assure you that you may rely on me and my delegation for all the support you may need in discharging your responsibilities. To that I would like to add a word of gratitude and admiration to Ambassador Hendrik Wagenmakers of the Netherlands for the competent and able manner in which he directed our work in February.

As I am speaking for the first time this year, I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome my colleagues, the recently appointed Ambassadors Roberto García Moritán of Argentina, Gerald Shannon of Canada, Hou Zhitong of China, José Pérez Novoa of Cuba, Andrea Negrotto Cambiaso of Italy, Mitsuro Donowaki of Japan, Thomas Ogada of Kenya, Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico, Stephen Ledogar of the United States of America and Horacio Arteaga of Venezuela. Wishing them all every success during their stay in Geneva, I would like to express my delegation's desire to maintain with them the close professional and personal relations we had with their predecessors.

This year's session of the Conference on Disarmament is being held at a moment in history when the prospects of forming a new, democratic and humane type of international relations free of fears, mutual threats and mistrust are brighter than ever. Without making a detailed account of past events, which has been done quite objectively by many speakers before me in this hall, I would like simply to share what appears to be a common feeling, that we have entered a post-confrontational era characterized by a common desire to build

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

up a peaceful world based on mutual confidence and co-operation rather than on weapons. Our fervent hope is that a further productive dialogue between States in the search for equitable solutions to outstanding international problems will make this process an irreversible one.

It is quite obvious that the business-like atmosphere in the relations between the USSR and the United States, their growing interaction in the resolution of regional conflicts, the broadened dialogue between them on global international problems and the tangible progress in bilateral disarmament have had a decisive impact on these processes and should continue to have such an impact in the future. In this connection, we expect the forthcoming Soviet-American summit to consolidate the positive trends in international life and to further relieve the nuclear burden hanging over mankind.

I hope it will not be considered irrelevant if I dwell for a while on European affairs. But what we are now witnessing in Europe, if I may use the words of my Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dimitrov, is the rapid disintegration of the post-war international order based on bipolarity and division and on ideological, political and military confrontation. Needless to say, this process is extending its significance far beyond the European continent. The recent developments in Europe are marked to a large extent by the drive for radical changes in political and economic life in the East European countries. Since 10 November last year Bulgaria has resolutely embarked on the road towards the creation of a democratic, multi-party political system and a pluralist, socially oriented market economy. Free and competitive parliamentary elections are to be held in the coming months. Meanwhile, a wholly representative round table has been set up to discuss the most pressing problems.

Bulgaria's orientations in foreign policy are also being redefined in the light of the rapid changes in the world and our national interests. Having committed us as integral part of Europe, we are determined to actively participate with all European nations in the formulation of new political approaches and the establishment of an effective security system in Europe, together with growing all-European integration in the economic, humanitarian and other areas. Consequently, we welcome the idea of having a 35-nation summit meeting in the autumn of this year and believe that preparatory work in that and therein great without delay. Bulgaria is of the opinion that at the meeting in Vienna between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO member States could be signed, and further confidence-building and security-building measures for the whole of Europe could be defined. We would also support further serious talks on military doctrines. The seminar held in Vienna was a useful first step in this direction.

In setting out its position on the above-mentioned matters, Bulgaria cannot fail to take into consideration existing realities in the region in which it belongs, and will evidently seek effective international guarantees for its security. Security, as we see it, is not a zero-sum game in which one side's gain is the other's loss. Anything that gives one side a destabilizing advantage risks increasing tension. That is why we will oppose any solution

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

that leads to unequal security for a given region or for individual States. This is especially valid for the southern corner of Europe, where pronounced military assymetries exist even now. Mutually acceptable solutions are needed not only for Central Europe but for the other regions as well.

Allow me to turn now to our concrete work in the Conference on Disarmament. I will not be the first to note with regret the difficulties our Conference has in adjusting to the pace of changes in the world. The state of affairs in multilateral disarmament is in sharp contrast with the overall tendency of growing multilateralization of international life. If this representative negotiating body continues its l'art pour l'art activities, failing to produce net results, it will become more and more difficult to rationally explain its raison d'ëtre to the public outside this hall.

The CW convention is in the immediate future the only possible multilateral agreement in a major area of disarmament. My delegation welcomes the prompt re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee with a mandate based on a reasonable compromise, and is convinced that under the leadership of Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden we shall be able to make considerable headway so as to come close to the conclusion of the convention.

Without at this stage going into the substance, I shall limit myself to two more general observations. The first concerns the need to conclude the convention at the earliest date in accordance with the recommendations of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. This would not only ensure the elimination of this abhorrent type of weapon, which is one of the major disarmament tasks, but would also have a great psychological effect as a proof of the ability of the international community to achieve measures of real disarmament. It would also add to the credibility of the Conference itself which has been seriously undermined in the past decade. From the political and organizational point of view alike, the moment is especially propitious for the mobilization of efforts aimed at the conclusion of the convention. There is a prevailing view that no big political, technical or procedural obstacles stand in the way of the negotiations; there is a mass of concrete proposals and ideas on outstanding questions; there is the new impetus provided by the recent Soviet-American joint statement. Finally, we have the collective wisdom and the dedication of the members of this body. As Ambassador Azambuja of Brazil observed, "we have assembled virtually all the necessary building-blocks" to complete our task.

My second observation concerns the need to ensure the universal character of the future convention and its rapid implementation after it is signed. We are of the opinion that some regional co-operative measures and activities before the conclusion of the convention may prove quite useful in this respect, as in view of the very nature of chemical weapons the most sensitive security concerns are likely to involve neighbouring States or States belonging to a given geographical region. These preliminary actions I am referring to might include declarations on possession or non-possession of chemical weapons, individual or joint political declarations of the States of a region indicating a resolve to become original parties to the convention, mutual trial inspections on a bilateral or broader regional basis, etc.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

The "nuclear items" still have priority for us. Consequently, we cannot be satisfied with their status in the CD. The international community at large is now practically excluded from participation in solving the problems of nuclear disarmament. The special responsibility of the Soviet Union and the United States in this field does not remove the responsibility of the other nuclear-weapon States, nor does it relieve the non-nuclear-weapon States of their right and obligation to actively participate in resolving the problems of nuclear disarmament. The CD should therefore play the role of a main forum in this field, providing a clear and realistic perspective as to the stages of nuclear disarmament, the place and role of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States in the course of its implementation, and the relationship between bilateral and multilateral negotiations, including principles and arrangements for promptly informing the members of this Conference on the state of the Soviet-American negotiations and any future negotiations with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States.

Another very important task is the elaboration of arrangements on, and mechanisms for, the prevention of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict. The main aspects of the problem have been identified, but unfortunately no practical work on agenda item 3 has been done yet. My delegation has supported the draft mandate suggested by the Group of 21 in document CD/515/Rev.1, considering it both flexible and comprehensive enough to allow substantive work on this agenda item. At the same time, we have expressed our readiness to accept other procedural forms to deal with the matter. The time has come, in our opinion, to have a fresh look at this agenda item taking into account today's security environment, the changing accents and priorities in disarmament and, not least, the practical possibilities.

The prevention of nuclear war requires the adoption of a wide range of various measures which could hardly be incorporated in one single agreement. Bulgaria continues to favour radical and comprehensive solutions such as, for instance, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Adherence to such approaches should not, however, close the door to the discussion of some partial measures related, for example, to confidence-building, increasing transparency and predictability in the military sphere and diminishing the risk of the outbreak of war, which could have good chances of success in the Conference. The idea of setting up a multilateral nuclear risk reduction centre might prove quite relevant in this connection.

In other words, it seems useful to select some priority practical measures from the general complex of issues related to the prevention of nuclear war, and to examine the procedural possibilities and ways of holding negotiations on them in the framework of item 3 of our agenda. In this context, my delegation fully supports the Swedish proposal that we should start negotiations under this item on a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas.

Our basic approach to the problem of negative security assurances has been elaborated upon in detail on many occasions. Today I would like to stress some points before the Ad hoc Committee embarks again on discussing this issue. In the light of the forthcoming fourth review conference of the NPT it becomes a matter of urgency for the Conference on Disarmament to address constructively the problem of how it should best proceed in its

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

endeavour to help develop further what is now available as regards guarantees for the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. My delegation takes good note of the new Nigerian proposal contained in document CD/967, and will examine it carefully. We support efforts to solve the problem by the most effective and credible means of an international instrument of a legally binding character with the participation of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. Such a multilateral instrument will, in our opinion, have a number of advantages over unilateral declarations. However, in view of the difficulties in building up a consensus on an early solution along these lines, we have also expressed our wish to consider other parallel solutions, including possible interim measures, which could be considered as steps conducive to the achievement of our final objective.

In conclusion I shall briefly touch upon the question of the nuclear test ban. Everything on this matter seems to have been said. Let me, however, stress once more the conviction that the halting and total prohibition of nuclear testing is the principal means of curbing the nuclear arms race, especially in the context of an initiated process of real nuclear disarmament. Let us hope that during this part of the session the Conference on Disarmament will finally assume its responsibility in this sphere, and I wish Ambassador Donowaki of Japan early success in this regard.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. That concludes my list of speakers today. Does any other member wish to take the floor?

I should like now to inform you that, at our next plenary meeting on Thursday, 8 March, I shall put before the Conference for adoption an additional request from a non-member, in this case Portugal, to participate in the work of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies. I wish also to announce that at the same plenary meeting on Thursday, we will be honoured by a visit from the participants in the Women's Meeting for International Women's Day, which is opening today in the Palais des Nations. On the occasion of that visit, which as you know takes place every year on International Women's Day, we shall receive a message from that Meeting which the Secretary-General of the Conference will read out for your information. We already have one speaker for Thursday - the representative of Sweden - and I hope that other representatives will follow his example, so that our guests may have much food for thought after their visit.

I have no other business for today. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 8 March, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.55 a.m.